Last week Saeed Shah reported on Jaish-e-Mohammad's [JeM] construction of a walled-off 4.5-acre compound three miles outside of Bahawalpur, located in the south of Pakistan's Punjab province.

JeM already has a headquarters and a seminary in the city center. This new facility is much grander. It includes a swimming pool, stable for horses and a playground for children. Gotta love those kid-friendly militants. The compound sounds just like my sleep-away camp, except I have a feeling its riflery range may be a bit more robust.

In all seriousness, this is deeply troubling. Over the past six months Pakistan has made strides in its fight against the TTP and TNSM, two organizations that consistently threatened the state. At the same time there seems to be no sign that a seeming reengagement with militant groups, which appears to have begun in 2008, has abated. Rather, the security services continue to provide – at least – passive support to groups like JeM.

It is likely that support for JeM goes beyond merely tolerance. According to a number of interlocutors I’ve spoken with in Pakistan the group is far more dependent on state assistance than is Lashkar-e-Taiba, which is financially independent. Further, JeM's hands are not nearly as clean as Lashkar's in terms of violence within Pakistan or involvement with al-Qaeda plots against Western countries. It is JeM’s involvement in such plots that makes the compound in Bahawalpur so troubling.

The site could serve multiple purposes. First and foremost, it could probably be used for training. At the very least, this could include indoctrination. More worrying is that unlike the many guerrilla warfare camps in the mountains, this compound will be used to provide the types of skills needed for urban terrorism. These include not only bomb making, but also reconnaissance and other intelligence-related skills.

Second, according to Shah's report, Bahawalpur serves as an "R&R" safe haven for jihadists battling in Afghanistan. They can rest up far away from the FATA, where militants must be more mindful of U.S. unmanned aerial drones. This means it can also serve as a hub for networking among current and would-be jihadis, which provides another type of functionality: a meeting point for Westerners seeking access to al-Qaeda.

In the past JeM and LeT were valuable to al-Qaeda because of what is called the "Kashmiri Escalator." A disproportionate number of British Pakistanis are of Kashmiri decent and those interested in making contact with a militant group often can employ familial connections in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir to find their ways to Lashkar or JeM.

Recruits procure training from one of the two groups, after which some of them are passed on to al-Qaeda operatives who are often in the FATA. In 2009 British security officials estimated that approximately 4,000 people were trained in this way since 9/11 and accounted for three quarters of the serious terrorist plots the UK faced. Westerners in search of training in the FATA now have another jumping off point to get there.

I'm still a proponent of staying in Afghan because I believe it is important to deny al-Qaeda safe haven there as well as to degrade the capacity of al-Qaeda and its allies to destabilize Pakistan. It appears al-Qaeda Central's power in FATA may be attenuating and fissures may be developing with the Afghan Taliban. If remaining in Afghanistan is necessary to keep things moving in that direction, then I'm still on board with the mission.

But developments such as this one give me pause. The Obama Administration recently released its metrics for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Objective 2b is 'Develop Pakistan's counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities; continue to support Pakistan's efforts to defeat terrorist and insurgent groups.' One of the metrics involved in measuring success is 'Extent of militant-controlled areas in Pakistan.'

JeM is a banned organization and known to be a close al-Qaeda ally. Indeed it is historically closer to al-Qaeda than LeT. JeM operatives have been involved in a number of plots against the West, and more than a few in Pakistan as well. Bahawalpur is not S. Waziristan. It's not ungoverned space. This militant-controlled area exists in the country’s heartland and is being developing in full view of the authorities.

Enormous sacrifices are being made to keep Afghanistan free from al-Qaeda and its allies. Meanwhile, next-door some of those same allies are building away in the seemingly safest of havens.

On a completely unrelated matter, I've been absent from FREErad!cals for too long. A summer associate position at RAND and a book deadline pretty much devoured my entire summer. Blogging suffered as a result. My apologies for that. The summer gig is now over and last week I turned in a draft manuscript for Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba. So I plan to get back to blogging here at least once a week.

Comments

Stephen - Some of those 'big' questions for you...what the heck should Pakistan do about JeM? Can the US help, or only hurt in this effort? How much of this is impossible to address due to infiltration and schism within the ISI?

Theo - 24 Sep 2009 (13:12)

Theo - Thanks for the softball questions and forgive the stream of consciousness reply. Pakistan has cracked down on different groups to different degrees at different times. And it has a history of going after individuals it considers a threat in order to control rather than destroy those groups it deems useful. In fact, JeM is hardly a coherent organization anymore. Its fractured in large part because of competing interests in J&K, Afghanistan and Pakistan [where elements have attacked the state and also engaged in sectarian violence]. I wonder [and have no answer] to what degree the Army/ISI rationalizes this as supporting the elements within the organization it things it can control and which it aims to use against India. In a perfect world, what Pakistan should do is dismantle JeM. But that's not going to happen. What really worries me is that things are moving in the wrong direction. The conventional wisdom is that until roughly early-mid 2008 the ISI was pulling back support for militant groups. By militant groups I mean outfits like JeM and LeT [vs. the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network and other Afghan-centric actors]. Since as early as March 2008 there has been a re-engagement. During the summer training camps became more conspicuous, militant outfits began holding larger public gatherings and there were larger scale attacks [against the Indian embassy in Kabul and, of course, the Mumbai attacks]. Cross LoC infiltration has also increased. I don't doubt that there are current and retired Army/ISI officers helping with these groups. But the trend toward increased support [or at least greater leeway] suggests this goes beyond rogue elements. That is what is so troubling about this new compound - it's not like JeM's activities are a secret. I was hearing about this compound when I was there in May. That speaks to an institutional culture of permissiveness that has grown since the civilian government came to power, suggesting the Army/ISI are reasserting their power in this realm. What I'd like to see is for the trend to reverse. I want to see the environment for JeM [and others like LeT] become more constrained and I’d like to see a real effort at DDR for those fighters who are in plain sight and not hiding in the FATA. There were small attempts made along these lines earlier in the decade, but any gains made in this regard have likely revered since. The US and UK are now putting pressure on Pakistan to do something about the JeM and LeT infrastructure, but I don't know how high a priority that is vis-a-vis Afghanistan and core AQ. And from my conversations with Pakistan Army and ISI officials - no matter what they say in public - India remains their primary concern and these groups remain valuable in that regard. The US worked successfully behind the scenes on India-Pakistan relations post-Mumbai. Ultimately, that is a major piece of the puzzle. On a bilateral [as opposed to trilateral] basis it remains unclear how US action in Afghanistan impacts leverage on Pakistan vis-a-vis groups like LeT, JeM, HuM, HuJI, LeJ. These groups are not the primary concern in the Afghan theatre. They fight there, but in a supporting role. But from a terrorism perspective, these groups are a major concern for the West. In my opinion, these groups pose a larger direct terrorism threat than do the Afghan Taliban, the TTP or the Haqqani Network. British Pakistanis may be training in the FATA, where these latter groups are the most powerful forces, but they are often training with the former alphabet soup of militant groups. At the least, its groups like JeM facilitating access to AQ. I'm not privy to the inner workings of US AfPak strategy, but I fear the effort to deny AQ a safe haven in Afghanistan has meant that curtailing these other groups is getting short thrift. Pakistan will help the West to disrupt plots and will arrest/kill members of JeM [less so LeT]. But this is responsive and limited. It is meant to control, rather than to dismantle. I’m still [barely] on the side of remaining in Afghanistan, but one of the key questions emerging for me is how to better marry our COIN needs there with our CT needs in Pakistan. If the ultimate goal is to deny AQ the ability to prosecute another attack, then I think there needs to be greater focus on gaining leverage to push Pakistan on these other actors. I recognize that because I look at Pakistani militant groups I am at risk of over-promoting their threat to the West. However, it does appear that we continue to give these other actors short thrift in our focus on the FATA and Afghanistan. If so, then part of the answer may lie in reassessing US assumptions about where to expend our precious leverage. Note, I think the UK is more concerned and more focused on these actors because of the threat homegrown actors will train with them. That said, I've seen reports suggesting the CIA has an extraordinary number of operatives in the UK to monitor British Pakistanis so clearly the US is concerned. The cynic in me believes these groups will be around for a long time I also believe that Pakistan is ill-equipped to wind them down. So if the decision is taken to exert more leverage on Pakistan vis-à-vis these actors, then it needs to be coupled with capacity building for the police and for investigative agencies that are not the ISI. Right now the ISI is predominate. The US/UK should be looking to build capacity for provincial police forces, the Federal Investigative Agency, the Anti-Terrorism Force and possible the Intelligence Bureau as well. The US/UK should also be prepared to contribute to DDR efforts in the event Pakistan is willing to move forward. Civil society is finally starting to look at deradicalization programs, but the problem is that Pakistan does not have any money for that. Channeling cash specifically earmarked for these efforts could help in terms of leverage and in terms of building capacity in the event that leverage actually produces results.

Stephen - 24 Sep 2009 (18:34)

Most interesting piece. What Pakistan requires is an effective derad programme that needs all sections of Pakistani society on board. www.facebook.com/abbasi

Mohammed Abbasi - 24 Sep 2009 (22:33)

Mohammed - I could not agree more. Right now the country is facing a lack of political will and actual capacity. As I wrote, people in civil society are beginning to think about what type of deradicalization effort or DDR program would work best. I've been part of some of those discussions and the part where things always break down is the same: the authorities have to want to do this. Derad is hard enough when the government and security services are on board. What Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Yemen all have in common is that the authorities were in the driver's seat. And even in those instances the results are mixed. The Pakistani authorities have to want to really demobilize these groups - I'd settle for DDR as opposed to actual deradicalization at this point. As of yet, I've seen little evidence that there is a real desire on the part of the Army or ISI to do so.

Stephen - 25 Sep 2009 (3:00)

Wow Stephen! Thanks for the very very thorough response. Could have been another 3 blog posts! Either here or in a future post, do you think the LeT attack method of swarming with small arms and grenades will diffuse to other terrorist actors post-Mumbai? Have you seen any indications or heard any whispers?

Theo - 25 Sep 2009 (15:34)

Theo - I've been meaning to write more on the issue of how groups like JeM fit into the US/UK AfPak strategy, so your questions forced me to begin the useful exercise of working out my thoughts in print. Re: diffusion of tactics, we've already seen it. In J&K when LeT introduced the tactic in 1999 JeM quickly adopted it there [and used it in the attacks on Indian parliament in 2001]. More recently, the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team and then the attack on the police training facility outside Lahore both witnessed the fidayeen method. Both were claimed by the TTP [with assists from LeJ and possibly others]. If I'm not mistaken, NYPD was concerned enough about copycat attacks to send three officials to Mumbai in the aftermath.

Stephen - 25 Sep 2009 (15:43)

Wow...it just seems they would be so easy to replicate. I saw a comment over at Kings of War from David Betz that struck me: http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2009/08/07/afghanistan-two-years-from-now-youll-be-saying-marcellus-wallace-was-right/ "It strikes me that a major problem now is that ‘insurgencies’ (if you want to call it that) no longer require as much active support from the population. Small groups can conduct attacks with massive impact. I think it’s entirely possible for extremist groups to wrench this society apart. Is there any reason why what happened in Mumbai could not happen here in, say, summer of 2012? What would happen after that?"

Theo - 25 Sep 2009 (16:37)

Stephen People that I have spoken with in the military are willing to work on a comprehensive derad programme with the right people… there are also individuals in Pakistan who are doing fantastic work to stem the onslaught of radicalisation and extremism - just look at the work of Waseem Mahmood and his Yeh Hum Naheen (this is not us - www.yehhumnaheen.org) project from one angle to Salafi individuals in Muridke and Quetta - Pakistan is a democratic nation with its defence forces answerable to the government of the day regardless of how effective that government is we need Pakistan to stay democratic and build on this to help that country deradicalise and move forward – but we need to work with a stable organisation - Pakistan Army from here the Pakistanis can train the police and work with other members of civil society... As a British guy from Pakistani background I have visited Pakistan many times and have spoken with people from different backgrounds to what is taking place in Pakistan and I agree things are complicated but together we can make a difference. Many people - including the Military, senior people from the main political parties as well as some Islamic scholars from different schools are willing to work together with people from other nations including the UK to tackle this threat - which is not just against Pakistan but muslims generally and if not tackled together then we here in the UK and US will have more arrests and god forbid attacks Most people I and my colleagues have met in Pakistan and among the British Pakistani diaspora - like many people in the UK and US are very concerned about the lack of focused responses to radicalisation by the government of the day in Pakistan so we are now aiming to work on the ground anyway... I suggest next time you are in Pakistan - to have an open dialogue with Pakistani women, youth, religious groups and NGOs as well as individuals in the media - I can assure you unity of purpose is there.

Mohammed Abbasi - 26 Sep 2009 (21:16)

Theo JeM and LeT have differing command structures/ areas of operations etc and more study needs to be done with individuals who were formally with these groups to make a more precise comment. As a threat to other nations apart from Pakistan and India - I would say JeM is more of a threat than LeT as its people seem more emotional in nature. Whereas LeT seems more organised and disciplined. But I have not done much research into these groups so far.

Mohammed Abbasi - 26 Sep 2009 (21:28)

Mohammed - Many thanks for your comments. I too have spoken with people in the Army and security services who are willing to undertake a comprehensive derad program. Unfortunately, I've also spoken with others who are pretty up front about the fact that the price for this [at least as far as LeT is concerned] is an appropriate settlement to the Kashmir issue. I also agree there are people working in civil society who are dedicated to this issue. I believe I made this point in both of my posts when discussing this issue. I have spoken with Pakistani women, youth, religious groups and NGOs as well as individuals in the media. I found many of them to be united in their desire to bring an end to militancy in Pakistan. However, I've spoken to some who less than enthusiastic. Your point about the military reporting to the civilian government is one I wish I could agree with. Pakistan is legally a democratic country with the civilian government in charge. But even many Pakistani analysts agree that the military and civilian government are not on the same page, and that the former is the most powerful institution in the country. so while I wish I could agree with you on this score, I'm more cynical. Amidst all of this it is important to remember that the overwhelming majority of the Pakistani citizenry does not support militancy.

Stephen - 27 Sep 2009 (13:33)

Mohammed is correct that LeT and JeM are very different animals. LeT has greater capabilities, but JeM may be more likely to attempt an attack in the West. That may be changing though. I think your question may have been a more general one, though. In other words, could any group [not just LeT or JeM] pull off a Mumbai-style operation in the UK. The answer is that Mumbai was easy and hard. Easy in the sense that it involved guys shooting indiscriminately and tossing grenades. But the preparatory work was hard, and I'd like to think MI5 and the Yard would perform better than Indian agencies did. 1. India knew an attack of this nature was coming - the US warned them and they had some intelligence of their own. 2. Entry by sea happened a number of times before. India did not have the resources to protect its maritime border. I'd like to believe smuggling the weapons necessary for this into the UK would be more difficult. 3. Infiltrating terrorists by sea or land would also be a challenge. unless they were homegrown, in which case its important to remember the 10 attackers trained for close to a year. British citizens attempting to train for that period of time would likely pop up on radar. 4. The two guys who did the reconnaissance were already in custody at the time, but India does not share info like that with Pakistan [for obvious trust reasons]. The UK relationship is better - the ISI does not want a repeat of 7/7 either - and so there is a better chance the two could work together to avert such an attack. 5. The CT response once the attacks began was atrocious. Space does not allow a full accounting. I spent several thousand words in my book describing what happened after ensued after the attacks began. Suffice it to say, it would be a comedy of errors were it not so tragic. None of this is to rule out such an attack in the West. There are [unfortunately[ work-arounds for some of the above impediments. But like many mass terror attacks, a lot of work and planning went into Mumbai and there were a number of places where the operation could have fallen apart. In other words, LeT was lucky as well as capable.

Stephen - 27 Sep 2009 (14:05)

I'd be more offended if Impostor Theo's comment wasn't a good one.

The Real Theo - 27 Sep 2009 (16:06)

Well some of my British Pakistani colleagues and friends along with Pakistani counterparts from the civil society are working on small initiatives to move things forward. Yes Kashmir is a sticking point - but things are too dangerous for everyone to be stagnant on this in Pakistan. If you are available next Friday afternoon we are arranging a meeting between different people who have an interest in helping British Pakistanis and Pakistanis to tackle extremism in different ways - if you email me on abbasimm@aol.com then I can send you more info on this. @Theo and The Real Theo both of your comments are cool

Mohammed Abbasi - 27 Sep 2009 (16:34)

Well I'm not sure how Theo's name got attached to my comment, but it may have had something to do with my posting before I had coffee this morning. I'll have the administrator sort that out first thing tomorrow.

Stephen - 27 Sep 2009 (16:46)

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