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Amm Sam

Preventing, er, Countering Violent Extremism comes to America: Part Four – Collective Identity as a foundation

Filed under: North America, Radicalisation, Terrorism

Thanks for staying with me as I am unfolding my argument (Parts One, Two, and Three). This is the fourth post in a series about the coming Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) policy in the US.  I launched into this because I am worried about some fundamental misunderstandings I have seen about radicalization and movement participation. I am also concerned that US policymakers aren't as aware of the flaws of the UK's Preventing Violent Extremism strategy as they should be (next post is on the "sins" of Prevent).

As I have argued in previous posts, the frustration-aggression and grievance obsessed models that policymakers and others are applying are woefully incomplete lenses through which to understand why people participate in movements and are driven to action.

In this post, I point to collective identity as the foundation of what has come to be called radicalization.  Islamist movements from al-Qaeda to the Muslim Brotherhood work hard to foster a sense of collective identity among Muslims worldwide. This identity is not simply "I am a Muslim" – 1.57 billion people hold that identity. It goes beyond that, tying into a network of shared meaning. I call it an ummah-oriented Muslim activist identity.  It involves membership in the ummah, which becomes the most salient source of identity and loyalty. Islam (or an interpretation of it) becomes the highest source of legitimacy for thoughts and actions from the mundane to the profound. It is an activist identity that fosters affective bonds between all members of the ummah and encourages a compulsion to some sort of organized action (some good, some bad, some neither – but let's try to keep moral judgments out of this as long as we can) on its behalf – whether that be donating to an Islamic charity for earthquake victims in Kashmir, protesting outside of an Israeli embassy, funnelling supplies to the mujahideen, or strapping explosives to your crotch and boarding a plane bound for Detroit.

This is not to imply that collective identity is inherently threatening. It is a social phenomenon that every person on the planet experiences in one way or another. Patriotism (otherwise known as nationalism) is a potent example of collective identity.

Collective identity is a necessary foundation for mobilizing people to action – for any cause.  Unlike grievance, alienation, relative deprivation, etc a great deal of social science research has unambiguously found that that collective identity is an explanatory variable or an "intervening causal mechanism."

Thus, when shaping policy on counter-radicalization, it would be wise to avoid designing and funding programs that encourage and foster an ummah-oriented Muslim activist identity among Muslim-American youth.  This mistake has been made in a big way by our British friends and it is one of the cardinal sins of Prevent.

Beyond that, grasping the concept of collective identity will allow policymakers, practitioners, and other stakeholders to better understand (1) why and how people are hostile towards out-groups, (2) what shapes peoples' interpretations of justice and injustice, (3) why some people are more willing to engage in collective action or individual action on behalf of a collective, and more.

Collective identity can be defined as

[A]n individual's cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution.  It is a perception of a shared status or relation, which may be imagined rather than experienced directly, and it is distinct from personal identities, although it may form part of a personal identity.  

More simply, it is a sense of "we-ness" with distinct boundaries. It is not just what "we" are; it is what "we" are not. Collective identity mediates the relationship between the society and the world, and the individual and society. It is at the crux of the relationship between objective and subjective realities. We have numerous collective identities simultaneously – but one collective identity is usually more salient than the others, focusing one’s attention on issues that impact the group one believes he/she is a part of, often at the expense of individual concerns.

All social movements seek to enlarge the sense of collective identity for mobilization. Studies have found that out-group hatred and discrimination is not difficult to activate or generate "even absent direct conflict and prior hostility." Such is the power of collective identity. Thus, generating a collective identity among a constituency is the important task facing social movements. Collective identity also serves five psychological functions for the individual: belonging, distinctiveness, respect, understanding/meaning, and agency. These functions help explain why grievances are seen as such and through what prism or scripts they are understood. Identity often precedes grievance. This explains in part, for example, why a British-Pakistani teenager from Leeds feels tied to Palestinian suffering.

Gamson explains that collective identity "is central in understanding people's willingness to invest emotionally in the fate of some emergent collective entity and take personal risks on its behalf." He continues:

It has the consequences for how people understand the sociocultural system they are attempting to change and which strategies and organizational forms they will see as appropriate. Groups that have achieved a successful integration of personal and collective identity will have an easier time doing what it takes to launch many kinds of collective action.

Melluci argues: "The propensity of an individual to become involved in collective action is thus tied to the differential capacity to define an identity."

Collective identity helps overcome the free rider dilemma, as "high levels of group identification increase the costs of defection and the benefits of cooperation." Drawing on Melluci's concept of "networks of shared meaning," Wiktorowicz explains:

[R]adical Islamic activists promote a set of values and identities that challenge dominant cultural codes. In doing so, they seek to create a common community of "true believers" tied together through a shared interpretation of Islam typically characterized by high levels of tension with common religious understandings. Activist proselytizing thus focuses on teaching Muslims (and even non-Muslims) about the deviance of mainstream interpretations while offering the movement's own understanding as definitive. The resulting network of shared meaning is the basis of a common identity that frequently involves commands to risky activism in the name of God.

This is a very broad overview of a huge body of literature and I am at a 1,000 words so my conclusion is abrupt. As such, I had to pass over some things, but I think I made the case that collective identity is a – if not the – foundation for any process leading to collective action or action on behalf of a collective.

Comments

I don't think anyone would disagree that collective identity plays a crucial role in processes of radicalisation and violence, but you are skirting the issue of what helps mobilise certain identities into violence while others remain non-threatening (or why some identities spur less violence over time -- eg, European nationalist identities these days being played out largely around the football pitch and not the battlefield).

I say this only because a major point of your critique of other theories is that their explanatory value is diminished because of the ubiquity of their main variable -- eg, grievance cannot account for radicalisation because everyone has grievances. Now you admit that everyone has collective identities so I'm not sure why you assign them such higher value. Your explanation would seem to put them in the 'necessary but not sufficient' category -- some other factors must combine with identity to produce radicalisation. What do you think are the most important of these?

Also, your explanation of ummah-oriented Muslim activist identity seems to imply that anyone who believes in the ummah is an Islamist. Do you mean to say this?
Jeni - 15 Jan 2010 (0:45)
Jeni - This is a series of posts. I am not leaving things at collective identity and I think I make that very clear.

Further, the purpose of this series of posts is NOT to provide a comprehensive account of radicalization and participation in Islamist groups, but to point out misconceptions in the existing discourse, offer alternative areas of inquiry, and discuss the flaws of Prevent. By talking about collective identity, I am trying to bring it back to first principles.

Further, as I say in the post: Collective identity "is a social phenomenon that every person on the planet experiences in one way or another." Ubiquity. I acknowledge this.

Once collective identity is established, individuals become susceptible to movement narrative and grievance interpretation, solidarity work, and collective action framing.

Why are some mobilized and not others for Islamist causes? The answer to this will likely vary depending on which groups, geographical location, etc. Answers to this cannot be provided without thorough field research, which has not properly been done when you are talking about Islamist mobilization in the West (aside from Wiktorowicz's Radical Islam Rising - if you'd like, I can recommend some literature on this subject from field work in various MENA countries)

Judging by research into other movements participation and non-participation can likely to be a combination of resource (material and non) availability and access, movement outreach, interactive interpretive processes, availability, and contact with movement activists through social/kinship (or possibly virtual) networks. Find me the money and we'll commission/do the study. Don't you think these studies should be done before a CVE policy is written?

Not everyone that believes in the ummah is an Islamist. I think that's painfully obvious, but perhaps I should have stated it explicitly. Belief in the ummah is a main tenet of Islam generally, but what a I am getting at is what a person believes that may require politically. There are many competing definitions of Islamism, and I'd rather not get into that debate here, but certainly a belief political loyalty to the ummah over other loyalties (to country, for instance) toward establishing societies with Islamic governance must be seen as Islamism.

Further, not every grassroots participant in an Islamist movement will agree with the "end goal" of a Caliphate. Movements are not ideological monoliths. This makes answering questions on who is and who isn't an Islamist even trickier. Someone may be an activist in a Brotherhood-tied organization, for example, but he/she is in it for different ideological reasons than others. This explains frame alignment activities like frame bridging, frame extension, and frame transformation - concepts I hope to address in this series. This is why we have seen Bin Laden complaining about how the US has trashed the environment and why Brotherhood groups in the US (selectively) push a civil rights narrative.
Amm Sam - 15 Jan 2010 (9:47)
Thanks for expanding on this -- I think the points you make here are pretty important for any overall discussion of identity. Obviously a lot more research is needed but I'm not sure it's fair to say we're operating blind here (as when you say field research has not been properly done) -- some of the Dutch studies, for example, have been very illuminating (although the Dutch context is so different from the UK's I'm not sure how transferable the key points are).

I also think it's obvious that not everyone who believes in the ummah is an Islamist, which is why I think the term "ummah-oriented Muslim activism" may be misleading. I know you are trying to capture the primacy of ummah loyalty, but including it in the term may capture more people than necessary in its sphere. I'm not sure someone who donates to Kashmiri earthquake victims really considers themselves to be part of the same identity pool as Osama bin Laden. I would think a defining boundary of the type of identity you are getting at would have some political (not broad religious) aspect. (I don't want to get into a debate over Muslim activism or Islamism either, just to say again that I think we should be careful and very specific when we try to establish the boundaries of such identities, especially given our inherent out-group status.)
Jeni - 15 Jan 2010 (12:12)
great post Amm. You've differed from my thinking by taking grievance out of the equation before looking at collective identity and I think that's useful - particularly, as you say, for explaining why British multicultural ideas in the 90s were not good.
I would still tend to see grievance - or at least association with grievance - as crucial, because I think it gives specific form to the type of collective identity that emerges.

For me, it's interesting to compare the ummah identity in Britian to the collective identity felt by 'native' (for want of a better word) Britons. The debate over what it means to be British has been going on ever since the collapse of the empire precisely because no one really knows how to define it. It tends to bang on about things like liberal democracy, multiculturalism, sarcasm and Monty Python - but in the end, there's very little patriotism in England. They keep trying to make St George's Day but no one can be arsed.

I wonder whether the lack of clear conception of our identity results from the fact that we face very little threat. Its notable that the debate was reinvigorated after the London bombings when we had something to say we were not - something to exclude. So perhaps to understand the form of the ummah identity you can't leave grievance out of the equation too much?
Eric Randolph - 16 Jan 2010 (6:58)

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