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I apologize for taking so long to continue this series (see parts one, two, three, and four). I have been travelling. Still am actually. I'd like to start in on Prevent in the UK. There are some significant misconceptions about Prevent in Washington (particularly about its implementation and the… View the full article +
I apologize for taking so long to continue this series (see parts one, two, three, and four). I have been travelling. Still am actually. I'd like to start in on Prevent in the UK. There are some significant misconceptions about Prevent in Washington (particularly about its implementation and the 'changes' in CONTEST II) that I worry may hinder informed policy analysis and formulation. In this post, I just explain the basics of Prevent and briefly mention some of its flaws. The sins of Prevent will be explained in more detail in following posts.
Prevent is one of the four 'P's' of CONTEST, the UK's counterterrorism strategy. It seeks 'to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism.' According to the revised CONTEST strategy released last year:To reduce the risk from terrorism – our aim – we need not only to stop attacks but also to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism. The Government introduced its revised Prevent strategy in October 2007. The strategy is based on a better understanding of the causes of radicalisation (the process by which people become terrorists or lend support to violent extremism), to each of which it aims to provide a coherent response.
Thus, Prevent seeks to challenge violent extremism ideology and support 'mainstream' voices, disrupt those who promote violent extremism, support vulnerable individuals, increase community resilience, and address grievances exploited by "ideologues." It does so by allocating funds to local authorities who in turn fund community initiatives that are meant to interface with Muslim, er, I'm sorry, 'vulnerable' youth and prevent them from becoming violent extremists. This is known as PVE, or preventing violent extremism and is the aspect of Prevent that Daniel Benjamin and other US government officials like Arif Alikhan, Assistant Secretary for Policy Development for the Department of Homeland Security (more on that later), seem to be taking a liking to
The police also receive Prevent funds. The Channel program, as part of Prevent, identifies those who are vulnerable to being recruited by those who seek to launch attacks in the UK and seeks to channel them in a different direction.
Now to some flaws (in this context, I recommend Lorenzo Vidino's Foreign Policy piece, 'Toward a Radical Solution'):
(1) Wrong partners: A significant number of the community groups being funded by local authorities and the Home Office happen to be Sawha-type Salafis (see page 53 of this book) or are oriented toward the Muslim Brotherhood. The reasoning behind this seems to be that these groups are the only ones with the Islamic credibility and 'street cred' to convince radicalizing/radicalized youth from becoming violent in the UK. Further, they seek to channel people into 'political activism' (usually Brotherhood-style) that serves as a sort of 'safety valve' for anger and disaffection.
This is problematic to say the least. If, as I have stated in earlier posts that grievance is far less important than grievance interpretation in driving people toward action, it is folly to fund groups who foster the same grievances and promote such similar narratives to that of al Qaeda. It is also misguided to finance those who are openly supportive of jihad against British and American personnel (not just military personnel) in Afghanistan and Iraq.
(2) PVE is not well-suited to the British Muslim population. The dominant religious interpretation and practice among those receiving Prevent funding are Brotherhood, Jama'at, and Salafi oriented. These are all hard-line interpretations of Islam, but the plurality of British Muslims come from a Sufi background. While these are all within the Sunni sect, Brotherhood/Jama'at/Salafi Islam are all in direct conflict with Sufism (despite the fact that Hasan Al Banna himself was a Sufi).
(3) There are no clear metrics for measuring success.
(4) PVE is a security program with a social orientation. It should be a social program with a security orientation.
(5) It is essentially a social re-engineering effort and there has been no serious discussion about whether social re-engineering is something the modern liberal state should be engaging in.
(6) The idea of local councils being empowered toward differential application of Prevent based on varying local environments is a good one, but a lack of oversight from the center has led to differential interpretations of what Prevent is trying to do.
(7) The idea of preventing extremists from becoming violent extremists (rather than trying to prevent them from becoming extremists in the first place) is cynical to say the least. The idea that the most effective way the British can prevent terrorism is to cede their Muslim youth to conditionally non-violent extremism (not entirely non-violent, as they support violence there rather than here) is intellectually bankrupt and reflects ignorance about the natures of (a) movement participation, (b) the Islamist movement, and (c) Islamist ideologies.
(8) Lastly, Prevent is in direct conflict with social cohesion. Empowering hard-line social actors within the Muslim community who do not support gender equality, homosexual rights, free speech, etc can only deepen divisions in society and create new ones. The societal consequences of this are already beginning to emerge and will only worsen over time.More on all this in following posts.
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The UK Home Affairs Select Committee has this morning published the results of its recent hearings on The Home Office’s Response to Terrorist Attacks, and it’s a mixed bag as expected. I haven’t read the whole thing but here are a few preliminary thoughts on its headline… View the full article +The UK Home Affairs Select Committee has this morning published the results of its recent hearings on The Home Office’s Response to Terrorist Attacks, and it’s a mixed bag as expected. I haven’t read the whole thing but here are a few preliminary thoughts on its headline findings.
• Ministers need to place greater emphasis on participation in emergency simulations.
No idea why this should be top of their list. I just keep hearing the late great Jean Baudrillard chuckling in my ears...
• A formalised National Security Committee chaired by the Home Secretary or Prime Minister and assisted by prominent, publicly accountable National Security Advisers must be appointed.
This is also exactly what the Conservatives want. They claim it will not be “a new bureaucracy but a centre of decision-making”.
• A lack of political will hindered the creation of regional counter-terrorism units; the Government was not proactive enough in instigating valuable reforms to the policing structure.
I wonder what the committee’s case is here? It implies that the reforms were valuable but happened too slowly. Big deal.
• The primacy of the Metropolitan Police in counter-terrorism operations should be enshrined in statute to increase accountability and simplify the command structures.
In statute? They already take the lead in SO15. I’m curious if the Met wants this too. Retired Met Deputy Commissioner Andy Hayman did make the point in evidence that if anything went wrong the current “gentleman’s agreement” between the Met and other forces would be seriously strained. What legal instrument would be employed to do this? Another Act of Parliament, in which the NSC is also set up forever? We’ve already had six, or seven, or ... how many is it now?
• The creation of a separate National Terrorism Agency modelled on the American Department of Homeland Security has the potential to cause major problems and will not represent a major simplification of policing structures.
Hallelujah. Such an organisation would have to be a standalone creation, or the merging of existing agencies. The last thing we actually need is a monolithic security agency à la DHS. There might be some short-term marginal gains but it seems to me that you need some tension between agencies to preserve oversight and avoid the worst group-think.
• The Government should immediately introduce legislation allowing the admission of intercept evidence in court.
Absolutely. If you’re going to collect this stuff then at least use it in court. It’s a form of processual transparency, and will help CPS’ case if the evidence is good enough to bring genuine prosecutions.
• Control Orders no longer provide an effective response to the continuing threat and the control order regime is no longer viable.
Finally. There has been a quite bizarre and persistent adherence by the government to control orders. Time to throw them out.
• Budgets for counter-terrorism work have increased greatly but there is a lack of Parliamentary oversight of this spending and a possibility of problems caused by "ring fencing" this money.
This criticism cuts a lot deeper than might first appear, although I doubt the Committee is really being ballsy here. How about asking the really important question: just why are we even spending this money? And what the implications of this securitisation are?
• The structures that are now in place may be suitable for combating the terrorist threat as currently constituted, but we are not confident that government institutions have the desire to constantly adapt to meet ever-changing threats.
“The terrorist threat as currently constituted”? And what’s that exactly? So, the threat’s constantly adapting, and government institutions are to do the same? Good luck with that. This is an aspirational point, and governments everywhere are unlikely to deliver on this point. It’s a good idea not to support an NTA, as that would almost certainly stifle the adaptation they desire. I also wonder whether they’re conflating adaptation and innovation as processes/outcomes of change?
We’re a few months shy of a general election, so don’t expect much to change before summer. If the Tories get in we will see a National Security Committee/Council (they use both terms), and perhaps some legislation. There’s also the Defence Review in the next parliament, so there may be some overlap there too. In the meantime, I leave you with Home Secretary Alan Johnson’s reaction to the report. Would we have expected this government to have said anything else?
“I totally refute the unsubstantiated and wholly inaccurate claims in this inadequate report. The government fully understands the threat this country faces from international terrorism and has extremely effective systems and processes in place to deal with it. Indeed, it is all the more surprising, given that the same committee found only six months ago that; ‘the UK's counter-terrorism strategy is first-class, effective and as “joined-up” as any system of government can expect.’"
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The subtitle of my 2005 book Elusive Peace is How the Holy Land Defeated America. And after listening to President Obama's annual address to Congress and the nation's televisions, I can categorically say that the Holy Land defeated America again. In his speech, Obama did not refer at all –… View the full article +
The subtitle of my 2005 book Elusive Peace is How the Holy Land Defeated America. And after listening to President Obama's annual address to Congress and the nation's televisions, I can categorically say that the Holy Land defeated America again. In his speech, Obama did not refer at all – not even a single word - to the Middle East peace process. True, he is facing huge problems and pressures at home, but not to mention the peace process which, in the past, was quite high on his agenda, is also to admit failure.
It would not be fair to put the blame for failing to resume peace talks in the Middle East on Obama alone, as Israelis and Arabs are not easy clients to deal with; but no doubt mistakes have been made by the Obama team.
Back in July 2009, I wrote in Words are easy and many that, "Obama is now losing momentum…" Indeed, Obama's principal mistake was his attempt to squeeze concessions from Israelis and Palestinians before bringing them together; to force the Israelis, for instance, to stop building settlements on the disputed land before the renewal of peace talks. He failed, however, to realise that in the never-ending-Middle-Eastern-souk, trying to squeeze concessions takes time and, in the meantime, you lose momentum. Instead, Obama had to take advantage of his (then) huge popularity and drag Israelis and Arabs to the negotiating table, forcing them to compromise then and there.
So what's next? As I have already argued in He's a nice guy, I have held barbecues at the Sea of Galilee and elsewhere, the way forward is to put on ice the complicated Israeli-Palestinian peace track and focus, instead, on trying to sort out the less complex Israeli-Syrian dispute.
Ahron Bregman -
"From Usama to Obama, if our letters could be sent to you by words, we would not have sent it by plans!" By those words Usama Bin Laden (UBL) started his short audio message to the American President. Despite the short length, the contents of the message were quite salient. This was one… View the full article +
"From Usama to Obama, if our letters could be sent to you by words, we would not have sent it by plans!" By those words Usama Bin Laden (UBL) started his short audio message to the American President. Despite the short length, the contents of the message were quite salient. This was one of the rare time that Bin Laden himself takes direct responsibly for an operation organised and executed by a branch of al-Qaida. By doing that, he wanted to say that after eight years since 9/11, he is still an organizational leader, not only just a spiritual 'godfather' for global jihadists. This brings to mind the statement of General Stanley McChrystal to the BBC last December: "I don't think that we can finally defeat al-Qaida until Bin Laden is captured or killed."
Another message was clearly demonstrated by the focus on Palestine. Al-Qaida intends to capitalize on the current increasingly frustrating conditions in the Middle East Peace Process in general and in the Gaza Strip in particular. Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan were all missing in Bin Laden's new message. Palestine was not; Bin Laden stressed that the operation was for it and about it. He repeated his old and probably favourite recruiting statement: "the Americans will not live in peace, until the Palestinians do."
The current conditions in the Middle East features a stalemate in negotiations between the PA and Netanyahu's government, a ceasefire imposed by Hamas in Gaza, a blockade imposed by Israel and the Mubarak regime in Egypt on Gaza, expanding settlement activities in the West Bank, a failure of the US envoy in the region, and a confession by President Obama that he underestimated the obstacles to peace in the Middle East. In other words, this is a good time for al-Qaida's recruitment activities. And the chances for recruitment can be significantly higher if the rhetorical focus is on Palestine. Bin Laden did not wait too long to capitalize.
A third message that can be read is that al-Qaida is continuing and officially adopting decentralization as its strategy in 2010. Branches, cells, or individuals may be self- or organizationally recruited. They will operate either by orders from al-Qaida Central or will self-activate. In the latter case, the centre will take responsibility for the action and it will be accredited to al-Qaida. Basically, we are back to 2001!
A final message is about al-Qaida’s resilience. After each defeat, there is a quick recovery. The defeat in Afghanistan (2001-2002) was followed by a re-emergence in the Afghan-Pakistan border regions (2004-Present). Other defeats in Saudi Arabia (2004-05) and Iraq (2007-09) were followed by resurgences in Algeria (2007), Somalia (2009) and Yemen (2009). The 'resilience' was a clear message conveyed by Bin Laden: "our attacks will continue as long as there a US support for Israel." Eight years after 9/11, al-Qaida's leader still has the will and the capacity to continue the terror campaign and still lacks the desire for changing the rhetoric, the ideology, and the behaviour.
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One of the things that's always bothered me about the 'lone wolf' moniker, used to describe violent extremists seemingly acting on their own initiative, is the simple fact that they’re usually not alone. Although there may be little or no material support from an active network of… View the full article +One of the things that's always bothered me about the 'lone wolf' moniker, used to describe violent extremists seemingly acting on their own initiative, is the simple fact that they’re usually not alone. Although there may be little or no material support from an active network of co-conspirators, 'lone wolf' Islamists act precisely because they are not, in their own minds, isolated at all: they have the love of Allah, solidarity with the ummah, and the ideological and psychological support of online and other communities, who may or may not be aware of their intentions.
For me, the term retains associations with Freud's Wolf Man, of whom Lacan wrote, his "fascinated gaze is the subject himself", and Herman Hesse's Steppenwolf, in which Harry Haller attempts to achieve transcendence of his paradoxical nature through the murder of the bourgeois Hermine. Haller's sociopathy may well be apparent in the psychology of some terrorists, and the narcissism of many terrorists and insurgents has long been evident. Think of Andreas Baader and tell me that guy didn't 'fancy himself', in modern parlance.
Please correct me if I'm wrong, but as far as I’m aware the use of 'lone wolf' to describe Islamist terrorists is a Western characteristic, and it speaks more to our north European cultural heritage than it does to its analytical utility in trying to understand the phenomenon. In fact, it may be a classic example of framing, or at least projection, and reveals more of our cultural anxieties than it does of the organisation or psychology of those who would attack 'us'. In that sense, it may hinder the West's abilities to counteract those individuals rather than help it.
Last October, Raff Pantucci suggested that lone wolves might run in a 'pack', which he quickly equated with a 'cell', a transference of terms quite compatible with theories of 'leaderless resistance' originating in earlier white supremacist movements. I don't know if Raff meant thereby to neutralise the lupine metaphor but I think he did it quite successfully anyway. Lone wolves are, in this context, potential or actual terrorists, and the collective noun is a 'cell', as per decades of insurgent and terrorist theory (i.e. it didn't start with Marc Sageman's 'leaderless jihad').
In a new article for Foreign Policy, essentially a review of jihadi online punditry, Jarret Brachman writes of Al Qaeda's Armies of One. Jarret argues that web jihadists are now 'joining the physical fight', and that,countries across the world―and particularly the United States―should brace themselves for an exodus from the Web forums and onto the battlefield by self-styled al Qaeda armies of one.
'Armies' can belong to larger military units like battle groups, military alliances and international coalitions, and the phrase taps into the belligerent rhetoric of jihad quite succinctly, as well as noting the importance of self-image. Again, I don't know if Jarret is intentionally abandoning the 'lone wolf' tag, but it does not appear once in his piece. The point here is that discussions of 'online radicalisation' usually include this phrase to somehow both describe and explain those who become radicalised via internet activity, and go on to perform acts of violence we normatively recognise as terrorism.
'Lone wolf' is applied to almost anyone outside of a traditional command structure, regardless not only of ideology, but whether they actually communicate with others of similar mindset. The original 'lone wolves' of the far right were defined by their lack of contact with their ideological brethren. The current crop of Islamists is defined precisely by mutual contact and the sense of shared identity, another reason why the term doesn't sit well with me. A terrorist acting alone is rare enough, one truly thinking alone even more so.
What should they be called, then? I’m not sure, and my thoughts can be rubbished at many levels. I don’t think Jarret means for 'an army of one' to be a unit of analysis, for example, and we would perhaps do best just to call these guys terrorists or extremists, or something that is generally understood across the security spectrum as a measure of tactics and intent. That doesn't help us discover or define their specific modus operandi but neither particularly does 'lone wolf', as this can mask the connections that actually exist between superficially autonomous individuals and the movements of which they are a part, formally or otherwise. The Unabomber was a genuine lone wolf, so perhaps Abdulhakim Muhammad and many others; the likes of Hasan Nidal are not. Just because the ties are virtual does not mean they act in isolation, and we should understand what lies behind the term before we sprinkle our discourse with it. Otherwise it means very little indeed.
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Last night, the UK Chief of General Staff Gen Sir David Richards gave a speech at the IISS describing his aspirations for British armed forces ahead of the forthcoming defence review. The basic gist was that our adversaries are fighting irregular wars and we should be prepared to engage them… View the full article +Last night, the UK Chief of General Staff Gen Sir David Richards gave a speech at the IISS describing his aspirations for British armed forces ahead of the forthcoming defence review. The basic gist was that our adversaries are fighting irregular wars and we should be prepared to engage them in flexible and agile manner. Upshot: ditch the Cold War mentality, and let's get busy in these new theatres, not least of which is cyberspace.
Whether this will transfer into new cyber forces, we don't know, but it seems likely, should the money be found for the required investment in this field. The current opposition is also very keen to develop offensive cyber capabilities, as set out last week in their national security green paper.
In his speech, Richards talks about the rationale for developing capabilities in cyberspace, which are actually quite understandable, but his comments at one point inevitably turned to al-Qaeda:... Al Qaeda's use of technology has created a global network of grievances that are often linked by a nihilist theology used to justify local violence. Dan Rather, the veteran US journalist, has commented that AQ’s physical location is virtual: "it's a worldwide, internet-based movement."
In all this time looking at the relationships between communications technologies and conflict, I have never once heard Dan Rather cited as an authoritative source on the subject. I tracked down the quote to an interview with Rather on HDNet's World Focus in December 2009, in which he said, "al-Qaeda is not centred anywhere ... it's worldwide, it's internet-based", and then proceeds, without drawing breath, to say that AQ is actually based in Pakistan.
Rather looks like a spent force in the interview―permanent fallout from his ignominious departure from CBS Evening News in 2005 I guess―but the inconsistencies in his statement are obvious. It would be unfair to single him out for criticism in this respect though―it's trendy now to say that AQ has a 'virtual sanctuary' and all that jazz, whilst at the same time declaring that we know them to be hiding out in Waziristan, or wherever.
Everyone who reads this blog knows that 'AQ' can be parsed in various ways. It's a shame that Richards saw fit to quote Dan Rather out of all the people that could have been cited on this subject. Elsewhere in his speech, he quoted another venerable silverback of news broadcasting, the BBC's Nik Gowing, on communications technologies and democracy. Richards could perhaps have turned to someone slightly more engaged with the subject, like Evgeny Morozov for example.
I very much doubt anyone at the IISS cared, and it's really no big deal, I suppose. Speeches like this do make me concerned that those who draft and make them aren't quite as clued up as they should be. Richards is a military man, and doubtless knows UK defence inside out, but if he's moving into cyberspace he may need to update his sources. It just sounds tired to trot out these two just because they're TV personalities.
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This week, the Philippines instituted a nationwide, five-month ban on guns in the run-up to elections in May. Several thousand checkpoints are due to be set up and dozens of people have already been arrested for violating the ban. Such a drastic measure – in a country with an estimated 1… View the full article +
This week, the Philippines instituted a nationwide, five-month ban on guns in the run-up to elections in May. Several thousand checkpoints are due to be set up and dozens of people have already been arrested for violating the ban.
Such a drastic measure – in a country with an estimated 1 million unlicensed guns and dozens of private militias controlled by political leaders and warlords – is seen as necessary given high levels of political violence surrounding elections in recent years. In 2007 more than 100 people died in violence around local elections. More recently, last November saw the massacre of 57 people in Maguindanao, and several local election candidates have been killed in different parts of the country. Kidnappings have also occurred, which makes it even more striking that the ban applies to private bodyguards. Even off-duty police and military are expected to leave their guns at home.
I was personally struck by this story because it reminded me that at times the study of political violence can wander into rather abstract territory. It's possible to spend a lot of time talking about ideology, psychology, social movement theory, indoctrination, cyber-recruitment, et cetera – and forget about the actual instruments of violence that militants use. Without the bomb and the gun, would we even care what radicalised fringe movements are up to? And yet, it seems to me we don't spend enough time considering access to weaponry as part of holistic counter-campaigns against political violence throughout the world (and when we do, it is often at the extreme end of terrorist acquisition of WMD).
In some ways, this makes sense. Guns and bomb-making materials are ubiquitous in modern society – easily trafficked and bought, relatively inexpensive, difficult to eliminate entirely. Why focus on the instruments of violence when their presence and availability are largely a given part of the equation?
But surely it is just as naïve or idealistic to think that radically minded and violently oriented individuals will ever be completely eliminated from society as well. Their specific pathology and political mindset may vary from decade to decade, but as a sub-constituency of modernity their continuing presence can be safely assumed.
The Filipino example highlights the extent to which political will – not projected efficacy – drives anti-violence strategies. Plenty of CT officials in the US, for example, wonder whether Mumbai-style attacks will emerge in the American homeland; we’ve already seen the tragic example of how much damage firearms can wield in the Fort Hood shootings. Yet there is virtually no chance that significant gun control measures will be enacted in the United States. Even the nationally traumatic mass shootings at Columbine and Virginia Tech did not generate sustained political interest in gun control. The idea that a country would ban guns as a preventive measure simply would not compute in an American cultural and legal context.
At the same time, efforts to control the vast flow of small arms around the globe have been hampered by both practical difficulties – such as the sheer number of guns in ungovernable conflict zones – and a lack of collective political action at the international level. The Obama administration has indicated a greater openness to multilateral efforts to control the small arms trade, generating the predictable howls of outrage among certain domestic American constituencies (who also, by the by, display some interesting ideological narratives of their own, as well as an apparently unswerving commitment to Godwin's law).
In short, while the Filipino example has its limits – i.e., we cannot count on a global gun ban to solve the problem of political violence – I think it's an interesting example of how different political contexts can generate different anti-violence strategies. Its temporary nature also showcases a certain sort of societal expediency, with restrictive measures tied to specific events rather than implemented ad infinitum (thus potentially antagonising key actors and the general populace).It is also, in the end, a refreshingly honest step to take – a way of admitting that political tensions in the country are at such a level that violence cannot be mediated or precluded without removing the instruments of force themselves. It is this sort of embrace of reality – rather than a fatalistic submission to the ubiquity of weapons – that one hopes might catch on in other parts of the world. At the very least, I think it deserves a greater voice in our ongoing discussions.
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Thanks for staying with me as I am unfolding my argument (Parts One, Two, and Three). This is the fourth post in a series about the coming Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) policy in the US. I launched into this because I am worried about some fundamental misunderstandings I have seen about… View the full article +Thanks for staying with me as I am unfolding my argument (Parts One, Two, and Three). This is the fourth post in a series about the coming Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) policy in the US. I launched into this because I am worried about some fundamental misunderstandings I have seen about radicalization and movement participation. I am also concerned that US policymakers aren't as aware of the flaws of the UK's Preventing Violent Extremism strategy as they should be (next post is on the "sins" of Prevent).
As I have argued in previous posts, the frustration-aggression and grievance obsessed models that policymakers and others are applying are woefully incomplete lenses through which to understand why people participate in movements and are driven to action.
In this post, I point to collective identity as the foundation of what has come to be called radicalization. Islamist movements from al-Qaeda to the Muslim Brotherhood work hard to foster a sense of collective identity among Muslims worldwide. This identity is not simply "I am a Muslim" – 1.57 billion people hold that identity. It goes beyond that, tying into a network of shared meaning. I call it an ummah-oriented Muslim activist identity. It involves membership in the ummah, which becomes the most salient source of identity and loyalty. Islam (or an interpretation of it) becomes the highest source of legitimacy for thoughts and actions from the mundane to the profound. It is an activist identity that fosters affective bonds between all members of the ummah and encourages a compulsion to some sort of organized action (some good, some bad, some neither – but let's try to keep moral judgments out of this as long as we can) on its behalf – whether that be donating to an Islamic charity for earthquake victims in Kashmir, protesting outside of an Israeli embassy, funnelling supplies to the mujahideen, or strapping explosives to your crotch and boarding a plane bound for Detroit.
This is not to imply that collective identity is inherently threatening. It is a social phenomenon that every person on the planet experiences in one way or another. Patriotism (otherwise known as nationalism) is a potent example of collective identity.
Collective identity is a necessary foundation for mobilizing people to action – for any cause. Unlike grievance, alienation, relative deprivation, etc a great deal of social science research has unambiguously found that that collective identity is an explanatory variable or an "intervening causal mechanism."
Thus, when shaping policy on counter-radicalization, it would be wise to avoid designing and funding programs that encourage and foster an ummah-oriented Muslim activist identity among Muslim-American youth. This mistake has been made in a big way by our British friends and it is one of the cardinal sins of Prevent.
Beyond that, grasping the concept of collective identity will allow policymakers, practitioners, and other stakeholders to better understand (1) why and how people are hostile towards out-groups, (2) what shapes peoples' interpretations of justice and injustice, (3) why some people are more willing to engage in collective action or individual action on behalf of a collective, and more.
Collective identity can be defined as[A]n individual's cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution. It is a perception of a shared status or relation, which may be imagined rather than experienced directly, and it is distinct from personal identities, although it may form part of a personal identity.
More simply, it is a sense of "we-ness" with distinct boundaries. It is not just what "we" are; it is what "we" are not. Collective identity mediates the relationship between the society and the world, and the individual and society. It is at the crux of the relationship between objective and subjective realities. We have numerous collective identities simultaneously – but one collective identity is usually more salient than the others, focusing one’s attention on issues that impact the group one believes he/she is a part of, often at the expense of individual concerns.
All social movements seek to enlarge the sense of collective identity for mobilization. Studies have found that out-group hatred and discrimination is not difficult to activate or generate "even absent direct conflict and prior hostility." Such is the power of collective identity. Thus, generating a collective identity among a constituency is the important task facing social movements. Collective identity also serves five psychological functions for the individual: belonging, distinctiveness, respect, understanding/meaning, and agency. These functions help explain why grievances are seen as such and through what prism or scripts they are understood. Identity often precedes grievance. This explains in part, for example, why a British-Pakistani teenager from Leeds feels tied to Palestinian suffering.
Gamson explains that collective identity "is central in understanding people's willingness to invest emotionally in the fate of some emergent collective entity and take personal risks on its behalf." He continues:It has the consequences for how people understand the sociocultural system they are attempting to change and which strategies and organizational forms they will see as appropriate. Groups that have achieved a successful integration of personal and collective identity will have an easier time doing what it takes to launch many kinds of collective action.
Melluci argues: "The propensity of an individual to become involved in collective action is thus tied to the differential capacity to define an identity."
Collective identity helps overcome the free rider dilemma, as "high levels of group identification increase the costs of defection and the benefits of cooperation." Drawing on Melluci's concept of "networks of shared meaning," Wiktorowicz explains:[R]adical Islamic activists promote a set of values and identities that challenge dominant cultural codes. In doing so, they seek to create a common community of "true believers" tied together through a shared interpretation of Islam typically characterized by high levels of tension with common religious understandings. Activist proselytizing thus focuses on teaching Muslims (and even non-Muslims) about the deviance of mainstream interpretations while offering the movement's own understanding as definitive. The resulting network of shared meaning is the basis of a common identity that frequently involves commands to risky activism in the name of God.
This is a very broad overview of a huge body of literature and I am at a 1,000 words so my conclusion is abrupt. As such, I had to pass over some things, but I think I made the case that collective identity is a – if not the – foundation for any process leading to collective action or action on behalf of a collective.
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The decision to proscribe Al Muhajiroun, Islam4UK, and a cluster of their successor groups is not entirely surprising. The combination of a successful prosecution in Luton of five members (or individuals linked to Al Muhajiroun or one of its off-shoots) after their performance at a homecoming… View the full article +The decision to proscribe Al Muhajiroun, Islam4UK, and a cluster of their successor groups is not entirely surprising. The combination of a successful prosecution in Luton of five members (or individuals linked to Al Muhajiroun or one of its off-shoots) after their performance at a homecoming parade for troops from Iraq in March 2009 and the fact that the Prime Minister got dragged into the public debate over whether the group was going to make some sort of ceremonial march through Wootton Bassett, all pointed to things coming to some sort of a head. The question really is whether this time it might mean something final for the group?
The short answer is: no. It would seem highly unlikely that this is the last we shall hear of Omar Bakri Mohammed’s acolytes. Last time the Home Office went forwards with a decision to proscribe some of them in July 2006 (that time it was Al Ghurabaa (the strangers) and the Saved Sect), the decision was made in the months after a group of them had been picked up and charged by police for comments they made at a protest outside the Danish Embassy in which they crossed the line and "solicited murder." In that instance four group members were given custodial sentences, while in April and May of 2007 another six group members were arrested on charges of "inciting terrorism overseas" and "terrorist fundraising."
This clamp-down of sorts appeared to work for about a year, though the group did not go away and simply adopted a lower profile. Then the website http://www.islam4uk.com popped up and things started to take off again, culminating with ever more confrontational and loud statements, an attack on Conservative Muslim peer Baroness Warsi and the protests for which the aforementioned Luton group were just convicted. And while I have seen nothing linking Christmas Day underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to the group, the renewed attention he drew to today's Londonistan meant some reaction was likely.
If history is anything to go, this should mean that we will see some further arrests in the near future – recent comments by some prominent members appear to tread close to the lines laid out in recent terrorism legislation of incitement or glorification of terrorism. But this will undoubtedly not stop them from reappearing once again, as such groups thrive on the oxygen of publicity (Anjem Chaudhury was quite open in his admission that the main reason for their raising the idea of the march in Wootton Bassett was to attract publicity), and given the relatively light sentences that will be imposed, these individuals will be in and out of jail (some of those from the previous swathe of arrests are already back out). These boys believe they are about God's work and a short stint inside is unlikely to deter them.
The more interesting question is what is their relationship to terrorism? The fact they have been proscribed under anti terrorism legislation means that the British government says there is a link – according to the BBC the impetus for the ban was a JTAC report that was commissioned after Al Muhajiroun reappeared last year – but it is hard to imagine that serious terrorists would associate with people who go around drawing the sorts of attention to themselves that the Al Muhajiroun chaps seem to thrive on. Instead, it is more likely that individuals who are involved in terrorism operate on the fringes of such groups – keeping an eye out for possible recruits amongst the zealous youngsters who are drawn in by to these groups. By shutting them down in this way, the government is at least creating a further hurdle to making them quite so easily accessible – though it is likely that they will in the long-term simply reappear under a new guise. For a period at least, they will have to tread carefully.
Conveniently I suppose, this decision to ban the group comes just ahead of an upcoming article that I have in March's Studies in Conflict and Terrorism journal entitled "The Tottenham Ayatollah and the Hook Handed Cleric: An examination of all their jihadi children," which catalogues the links to terrorism from Al Muhajiroun and Supporters of Shariah (Bakri and Hamza's groups respectively). More on that later!
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There's a good discussion going on at Kings of War, our academic cousins in the KCL family. Rob Dover's post, Terror on Campus, has kick-started some informed debate about the role of higher education in radicalisation, and the susceptibility of well-educated persons to radical narratives and… View the full article +There's a good discussion going on at Kings of War, our academic cousins in the KCL family. Rob Dover's post, Terror on Campus, has kick-started some informed debate about the role of higher education in radicalisation, and the susceptibility of well-educated persons to radical narratives and ideas.
In response to Rob's suggestion that 'a look back in history might be worth while', the commenters have come up with several historical examples, touching on the 'engineers of jihad' phenomenon and the radical movements of the 1960s and 1970s. David Betz mentions the Red Army Faction (RAF/Baader-Meinhof) and wonders about the 'revolution is sexy' interpretation of RAF recruitment, which Steve Corman develops further. I've just finished reading Stefan Aust's The Baader-Meinhof Complex (2008), the revised edition published as a tie-in to the film of the same name that acts mainly as a visual portrayal of the book. David is right about the narcissism of the main protagonists, particularly Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin, and the relatively dispassionate tone of movie and book allows this facet of their characters to emerge quite naturally. Although we can happily argue that the initial impetus of the RAF derived in part from the broader political milieu of the turbulent '60s, including the student movements of the far left―radicalised bourgeois youth, let’s not forget―it's hard to ignore the role of charisma in the sustenance of the first and second generations of the RAF.
More pertinent to the radicalism/education discussion, I came across a passage late in the book on the life of Zohair Youssif Akache prior to his role as 'Captain Mahmud' in the hijacking of a Lufthansa 737 in 1977. The hijacking was intended to force the West German government to release Baader, Ensslin and other RAF members from prison, and ended in Mogadishu in October 1977 after the plane was successfully stormed by German special forces. Have a read of what Aust has to say about Akache, and note the similarities between this account and the concerns raised recently about Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s background and the intelligence failings prior to his attempted destruction of Delta Flight 253:'Captain Mahmud', whose Iranian passport bore the name of Ali Hyderi, and whose real name was Zohair Youssif Akache, was known to the police. He had enrolled as a student of the Chelsea College of Aeronautical and Automobile Engineering in London in 1973, and received his diploma in aeronautical engineering two years later.
He first came to the notice of Scotland Yard in December 1974, when he suddenly attacked police officers at a peaceful pro-Palestinian demonstrators in Trafalgar Square. He was known to be a member of the PFLP, and was in danger of being deported, but was finally allowed to remain and continue his studies. A year later, Akache attacked the police during another pro-Palestinian demonstration. This time he was arrested and ended up in Pentonville prison. After going on hunger strike, he was deported to Beirut.
He was back in London at the beginning of 1977. Under a false name he moved into a hotel opposite the Royal Lancaster, where the former prime minister of North Yemen was staying. On 10 April, the ex-prime minister, with his wife and a member of the staff of the Yemeni embassy, got into a Mercedes outside the hotel. Akache had been in wait behind the car. He walked around the vehicle, opened the right-hand front door, and fired a pistol fitted with a silencer at the three occupants. They died instantly. Akache managed to fly out of London the same day. Scotland Yard had had him under surveillance before the assassination, but had not sent his personal details and description through to Heathrow Airport. (pp.384-5)
Six months later he was dead on the Somali tarmac, and dozens of airline passengers could breathe again. The differences between the two men are as great as their superficial similarities but 32 years later, does any of this sound even remotely familiar?
Introduction
FREErad!cals is the ICSR blog. It's a forum for debate and fresh ideas on radicalisation and political violence. It features some of the most innovative, young thinkers, discussing radicals and radicalisation. They are looking at how the challenge has been understood, and how it should be addressed.
Contributors
Guest Contributors
Recommended Reading
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General
- The Long War Journal
- Global Terrorism Analysis Jamestown Foundation
- MICROCON: A Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict
- University of Maryland, START Center
- Terrorism and Homeland Security RAND
- Terrorism Answers Council on Foreign Relations
- Institute for War & Peace Reporting
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty
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Blogs
- Jihadica
- The Cable
- Abu Muqawama
- Danger Room - Whats Next in International Security
- Jarret.Brachman.Phd
- Small Wars Journal Blog
- Kings of War
- Counterterrorism Blog
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Regional
- Ghosts of Alexander
- Registan
- The Pakistan Policy Blog
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Online Radicalisation
- Cyber Law Blog
- Ubiwar
- MetaSecurity Security of Virtual Worlds
- Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University
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Posted by Amm Sam on 05/02/10