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Peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians have resumed in Washington. However, to say that I'm holding my breath and expecting a breakthrough would be an exaggeration, to say the least. I think that two important indicators could signal to us when this all turns into a serious… View the full article +
Peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians have resumed in Washington. However, to say that I'm holding my breath and expecting a breakthrough would be an exaggeration, to say the least. I think that two important indicators could signal to us when this all turns into a serious exercise:
The first would be a new coalition in Israel. My impression is that, by now, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu understands – intellectually – that the occupation must come to an end. But politically he isn’t ready for a change; his current coalition government is composed of parties and individuals (see my previous post 'No Peace, I’m afraid') who are just too right-wing to accept a deal with a two-state solution at its heart. Thus, any progress on the peace process will require a new government in Israel. This could be achieved either through new elections, or a change of the coalition’s composition.
The second indicator would be a willingness of President Barack Obama to intervene personally in the negotiations and put pressure on Israel. As I’ve already put it in 'It has nothing to do with my rude comment about balls', the lesson of history is that the Israelis only move under pressure, and the one who could apply the necessary pressure on them is the President.
Alas, President Obama is up to his eyes with domestic and other problems, and I don’t really expect him to press the Israelis, at least until after the US midterm elections in November.
In the meantime, extremists will try to sabotage the peace talks. The other day, a Palestinian attack on an Israeli car near Hebron killed four settlers. It’s unlikely that this will, and perhaps
other attacks, derail the talks and, anyway, we shouldn’t expect any significant progress at this stage. -
In early June I blogged about the sectarian attacks on two mosques in Lahore, in which over 70 people were murdered. The mosques belonged to the Ahmadiyya community, a Muslim minority group who have increasingly become a target for sectarian Islamist groups in Pakistan, who allege that the… View the full article +
In early June I blogged about the sectarian attacks on two mosques in Lahore, in which over 70 people were murdered. The mosques belonged to the Ahmadiyya community, a Muslim minority group who have increasingly become a target for sectarian Islamist groups in Pakistan, who allege that the Ahmadiyya represent a deviant sect of Islam.
Partly because of official persecution in Pakistan, the Ahmadiyya moved their headquarters to the UK in the 1980s. But the presence of Ahmadiyyas in the UK goes back over a century and predates the waves of immigration from South Asia since the 1960s. It is a worrying development therefore that some of the sectarian animosity faced by the Ahmadiyya in South Asia seems to be gaining traction in the suburbs of Britain.
According to the Surrey Comet, a police investigation has recently been launched following a leaflet campaign calling on Muslims to murder ‘Qadiyans’, which is often used as a derogatory term for the Ahmadiyya. Thus far, the person or organisation behind the leaflet campaign is unknown, though it is – at the least – an attempt to stoke up tensions between Ahmadiyyas and other Muslims in Surrey. The area is home to the Baitul Futuh mosque complex, a focal point for British Ahmadiyyas, and the leaflets reportedly make positive references to the mosque attacks in Lahore.
This is a reminder of the sectarian dynamic at the core of some versions of extreme Islamist theology, which transcends culturally-specific contexts. While the Islamist narrative is often seen as an outpouring of political frustrations (over foreign policy, for example) or social dislocation, the hostility to this small community (and other minority religious sects) is an integral part of the ideology espoused by numerous organisations, from al-Qaeda to the Taliban. -
The chaps over at the Center for Social Cohesion were kind enough to share with me a copy of their recent comprehensive text Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections. It got quite a bit of media attention at the time of publication, as it was basically the only substantial text to be published… View the full article +The chaps over at the Center for Social Cohesion were kind enough to share with me a copy of their recent comprehensive text Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections. It got quite a bit of media attention at the time of publication, as it was basically the only substantial text to be published in time for the five year anniversary of the 2005 bombings on the London underground (this is not to forget the special edition of International Affairs that also came out at around the same time featuring a number of heavy hitters in the world of terrorism studies).
The report meticulously goes through all of the “Islamist related offences” committed in the UK between 1999-2009, though it looks as far back as 1993 for plots which have British links: some early fighters in Bosnia drawn from Azzam publications tapes, and Ramzi Youssef, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center plot, who was no doubt radicalized by his time in Oxford and Swansea.
In an attempt to bring some statistical analysis to bear on the information, they have culled background and biographical data to create pie charts and tables. Problematically, the dataset itself is not actually that big (they have included “120 Islamism-inspired terrorist convictions and attacks in the UK”), meaning that the figures are a little less than conclusive and rapidly impacted by subsequent prosecutions.
Nevertheless, one detail that does seem clear is that South Asian’s, and specifically Pakistani’s, are the largest single group to be drawn towards terrorism in the UK. This may seem unsurprising given the fact that they are the largest single community of Muslims in the UK, but the detailed figures are actually quite interesting. Even if one includes all of the individuals classified as of uncertain South Asian origin into the Pakistani total, the figure that is reached is 36.21%. This compares to 46.69% of Muslims drawing their identity from Pakistan in the general population (according to the 2001 census figures). Meaning that Pakistani’s are, proportionally speaking, substantially under-represented in the terrorist roster in the UK as drawn up by CSC.
But frankly, the most useful thing about the report is the fact that they have collected in one place a great deal of the information about the many individuals who have been convicted for Islamist terrorism related offences in the UK. For those who follow these things (and for those only interested in the topic in passing), this will become a very useful reference tool.
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(Dis)Loyal readers: I have taken a position that does not allow me much opportunity to blog, so I apologize for my long and unexplained absence. But on to the matter at hand.There is no shortage of commentary about the “Ground Zero Mosque,” which is neither at Ground Zero nor… View the full article +
(Dis)Loyal readers: I have taken a position that does not allow me much opportunity to blog, so I apologize for my long and unexplained absence. But on to the matter at hand.
There is no shortage of commentary about the “Ground Zero Mosque,” which is neither at Ground Zero nor exactly just a mosque, so I will keep this short and try to contribute an original perspective. I am not going to address what I think about the morality, wisdom, and legality of the decision to build this center in close proximity to the site of the World Trade Center. We have all had enough of that. I only focus on the strategic angle.
To be clear at the outset, I do not think the Cordoba Initiative is Islamist-inclined. However, as a friend of mine, who is good at assessing these things, recently noted in an email to me:My own view…is that the Cordoba guys are not Islamists. At least not in a meaningful way. Certainly, Islamists will seize it and do the whole, "Look at those American crusaders persecuting us Muslims.”
A small example from the Wall Street Journal:Islamic radicals are seizing on protests against a planned Islamic community center near Manhattan's Ground Zero and anti-Muslim rhetoric elsewhere as a propaganda opportunity and are stepping up anti-U.S. chatter and threats on their websites.
One jihadist site vowed to conduct suicide bombings in Florida to avenge a threatened Koran burning, while others predicted an increase in terrorist recruits as a result of such actions.
"By Allah, the wars are heated and you Americans are the ones who…enflamed it," says one such posting. "By Allah you will be the first to taste its flames."
As I have maintained before on this blog, the Islamist movement represents a late modern global insurgency of sorts. A standard tactic and technique of insurgency is to provoke the counter-insurgent into reacting disproportionately in such a way that helps to mobilize the insurgent’s constituency against the counter-insurgent.
The “Irgun Strategy” is one term that has been ascribed to this technique, as the Jewish terrorist organization of the same name designed its attacks during the Mandate Period to provoke the British into implementing repressive measures against the entire Jewish population. But the Irgun were not the first to invent it, nor were they the last to use it. The Taliban continue to use it to great effect in Afghanistan by firing upon Coalition Forces from civilian homes, hoping to draw artillery fire or air strikes on civilians for a propaganda coup. This was the logic behind General Stanley McChrystal’s mandate to avoid air strikes under these circumstances. And it is no small irony that Israel has faced enemies that have used the “Irgun Strategy” – Hizballah, Hamas, and their fedayeen predecessors (although the Israeli defense establishment has not shifted their strategy and operations accordingly...a topic for another post).
The uproar (there are some particularly grotesque examples from Newt Gingrich and Sarah Palin, but I think they are just trying to keep up with their constituencies) over the Cordoba Initiative Mosque and Cultural Center is the latest and most spectacular demonstration that we fail to understand the Islamist Movement’s Irgun Strategy.
Western Islamist groups consistently engage in provocative behaviour designed to draw out the worst elements of the Western polities and thus simplify an element of mobilization that social movement scholars refer to as boundary activation – activities that contribute toward the increasing saliency of inter-group differences, whether they are economic, social, religious, racial, ethnic, or otherwise. Boundary activation draws out the “us vs. them” dynamic that often relies on a narrative of exclusion or discrimination that feeds a sense of vicitimization.
This creates and solidifies in-group cohesion and loyalty and strengthens out-group hatred and distrust. In this case, Islamist activists will be able to use this episode to argue – this time, with some credible evidence – that Muslims cannot ever be truly part of America and cannot enjoy the same rights as other Americans. The narrative continues that America leads the West in a war against Islam, in which Israel is a proxy (or America is a proxy of Israel, depending on which version you prefer). This all creates what some have called an oppositional consciousness among many Muslim youth with interactive exposure to narrative of Islamist activists. This is an empowering mental state that prepares members of a group to act to undermine, reform, or overthrow an incumbent system. In other words, it is a mental state that prepares members of a group for insurgency.
Long story short: the vitriol over the Cordoba Initiative makes it easier for the bad guys to recruit worldwide.
Thus we see figures like Sarah Palin, Newt Gingrich, and the grotesque Pamela Geller willingly serving as propaganda tools for the Islamist movement and serving the Islamist strategy. So I turn their obscene fear-mongering and disingenuous flag-waving back at them (only slightly tongue-in-cheek):
Ms. Palin and Dr. Gingrich – stop helping al Qaeda.
As I mentioned at the beginning, whether or not the Cordoba Initiative project is an intentional provocation is another matter. There has been much written about the group and I won’t repeat it here. While Imam Rauf has said some offensive things, the evidence that he and his organization are Islamist-inclined is thin. Regardless, it serves the larger Islamist strategy and shows Western Islamist groups the power of creating such a divisive fuss during an American election year. This makes further provocations inevitable. Let us hope we will react with more sense next time.
A more clever response would have been to warmly welcome the Cordoba Initiative to New York, but politely and firmly request that they sign on to an international campaign to stop the persecution of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community in Pakistan and elsewhere or to co-sponsor the construction of a Christian church and a synagogue in a Muslim country (Saudi Arabia would be asking too much – it would be bombed by someone anyway). Or perhaps just to build Christian and Jewish prayer rooms in the Cordoba Initiative Mosque and Cultural Center. Even if they were to say “no thank you,” that would still be a strategic win for the United States, if done right. -
Yemeni-American preacher Anwar al Awlaki has becoming something of an international boogeyman, with traces and connections to him being found amongst an ever expanding array of terrorist plots around the world. According to the U.S., he has gone beyond being a nuisance preacher to being actively… View the full article +Yemeni-American preacher Anwar al Awlaki has becoming something of an international boogeyman, with traces and connections to him being found amongst an ever expanding array of terrorist plots around the world. According to the U.S., he has gone beyond being a nuisance preacher to being actively involved in terrorist plotting – his connections to underpants bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab have earned him a place on the U.S. Predator hit-list.
But in many ways, more interesting than his apparently growing role as a preacher moving up the ladder to training individuals, is his ability to reach out through cyberspace to an ever-expanding and diverse community of people. Two recent cases highlight this in particular: Paul “Bilal” Rockwood and his wife Nadia in Alaska, and on the other side of the world in Singapore, Muhammad Fadil Abdul Hamid.
Awlaki is the common thread between the two. According to court documents, Rockwood was a long-term follower, having converted in “late 2001 or early 2002” while he was living in Virginia. He rapidly became a “strict adherent to the violent Jihad-promoting ideology of cleric Anwar al-Awlaki….This included a personal conviction that it was his (Rockwood’s) religious responsibility to exact revenge by death on anyone who desecrated Islam.” While his timings appear to correlate with when Awlaki was also in Virginia it is unclear from information in the public domain whether they actually met.
Having been radicalized, over the next eight years Rockwood, who when he was arrested was a 35 year-old weatherman in the charmingly named King Salmon, Alaska, identified a list of possible targets through “visiting websites on the internet that professed to identify individuals, including American servicemen, who were alleged by the websites to have committed crimes of violence against Muslim civilians.” He further researched how to execute them “including discussing the use of mail bombs and the possibility of killing targets by gunshot to the head.” He narrowed his list down to 15 possible targets and planned on sharing this list, through his knowing wife, with a third person whom he believed shared his beliefs. From here it got to the Feds, certainly suggesting that this third party was not all that he or she seemed.
On the other hand, it seems highly unlikely that Muhammad Fadil Abdul Hamid ever had opportunity to meet the preacher. A 20-year old national serviceman in Singapore, he self-radicalized online and attempted to make contact with Awlaki through the net claiming to want to fight alongside him in Yemen. He was also in contact with a suspected Al Qaeda recruiter who urged him to go fight in Afghanistan and he produced at least one “self-made video glorifying martyrdom and justifying suicide bombing.” According to information released after his detainment under the Internal Security Act, his main influences appear to have been Anwar al-Awlaki and Australian-Lebanese former boxer Feiz Muhammed.
At around the same time as they detained Hamid, Singaporean police also placed Muhammad Anwar Jailani, 44, and Muhammad Thahir Shaik Dawood, 27 on two-year “restriction orders.” Jailani was apparently distributing Awlaki material, while Dawood went so far as to try to join the preacher in Yemen, though he was unable to connect with him and was instead rather disillusioned by what he did find there.
While not delving into the detail of the plots (which are not quite on the scale of 9/11), the running theme is Anwar al-Awlaki and his ability to provide some sort of indirect ideological guidance to people through the internet. While he may have had some contact with Rockwood early on, it still took Rockwood about five years before he started his research, and another three years before he moved into action. For the Singaporean’s, no contact appears to have taken place, but (like many others) the men appear to have sought out Awlaki as a guide to carrying out contemporary jihad. It would seem in many ways as though Awlaki, rather than Osama or even Abu Musab al Suri, is actually proving to be the globalized voice of jihad. His cry for personalized jihad in English appears to resonate amongst the global community of disenfranchised individuals across racial, national, and generational lines (I have not seen any evidence of gender yet, but women in jihad remains a marginal feature).
What is not clear if this is anything particularly new, or whether he is simply the latest in a long line of radical clerics whose charisma is able to draw people to him and it his ability to use the internet that has given him a global reach. Whatever the case, it is clear that his online presence is also what will guarantee him longevity beyond if the Predator’s do ever catch him.
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The recent killings of al-Qaida’s top commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan by US airstrikes raise the common question of how such developments are going to affect the organization. Whereas these events highlight another loss for al-Qaida, recent history has shown that the organization recovers… View the full article +
The recent killings of al-Qaida’s top commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan by US airstrikes raise the common question of how such developments are going to affect the organization. Whereas these events highlight another loss for al-Qaida, recent history has shown that the organization recovers quickly and, in some cases, capitalizes on the deaths of its commanders.
The first recent hit was in Iraq. Abu Umar al-Baghdadi (Hamid al-Zawi), the Emir of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), was killed on 18 April in al-Tharthar desert area, north of Baghdad. He was killed with Abu Ayyub al-Masri (Yusuf al-Dardiri, otherwise known as Abd al-Mun‘im al-Badawi), his Minister of War. An Egyptian, who was a former mid-rank in al-Jihad Organization of Egypt, al-Masri succeeded the deputy of Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, in taking the command of al-Qaida on 15 June 2006. In October of that year, al-Baghdadi’s Shura Council of al-Mujahidin and al-Masri’s al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) merged together, along with more than ten other smaller organization and various factions to form the ISI.
However, the formation of the ISI was a beginning of a decline of al-Qaida’s influence. The indiscriminately violent behaviour of AQI and its successor, the ISI, along with the expansion of the lists of enemies and targets to include less cooperative Arab-Sunni tribesmen, in addition to the coalition forces, the Iraqi military and security bureaucracies, Iran, and virtually all non-Sunnis; led to the revolt of Arab-Sunni tribesmen in early 2007. Al-Anbar province started the sahwat (awakening) phenomenon that not only pointed the guns at the AQI instead of the coalition forces, but also disseminated anti-Iranian propaganda and ideological materials as opposed to anti-American. The lack of a charismatic leader after al-Zarqawi and the stricter security policies of Syria and Saudi Arabia to stop the flow of funds and volunteers also helped undermine the AQI. Since no insurgency can survive without popular support, especially when the geography is not insurgent-friendly and the ideology and its manifestations are far from attractive to the locals, there was a sharp decline in the operational capacity of AQI/ISI after 2007.
Despite that, the ISI was swift in replacing its top commanders. Its new communiqué declared that “two were gone and three came.” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Qurashi became the new emir, Abu Abdullah al-Qurashi became his deputy and first minster, and al-Nasr Lidin Allah Abu Sulayman became the Minister of War, replacing the late al-Masri. All of these aliases have historical and religious relevance. Quraysh is the tribe of Prophet Muhammad and linking the ISI new leaders directly to the Prophet makes them ashraf or ‘noblemen’ in the Islamic culture. Al-Nasr Li Din Allah (The Supporter of the Religion of God) was the title of Saladin, the famous Muslim commander who fought against the Crusaders in the Levant in the 12th century. AQI/ISI is using more symbolism to substitute for the lack of charismatic leadership.
As for the new commanders, there is little known about them. Abu Bakr was a commander of one of small organizations that merged under the ISI. His minister of war is a Moroccan with close contacts to al-Qaida Central, like his predecessor. In his very first statement, al-Nasr followed the rhetoric of al-Zarqawi calling for an escalation against Shiite targets and Iraqi military and security forces.
In Afghanistan, Sheikh Said (Mustafa Abu al-Yazid), another former mid-rank in al-Jihad Organization of Egypt who became a leading figure in al-Qaida and, in May 2007, its top commander in Afghanistan, was also killed in a drone strike in Pakistan on 21 May. But, as opposed to its sister in Iraq, al-Qaida in Afghanistan (AQA) did not lack the charismatic leadership or the symbolism. To avoid the mistakes of Iraq, Sheikh Said declared more than once that al-Qaida is fighting under the banner of the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan (the Taliban). In his interview with al-Jazeera in June 2009, he urged all other armed groups, including the Islamic Party (partly led by Gulbddin Hekmatyar), to join the Taliban. In other words, Sheikh Said was ‘embedding’ al-Qaida in its local contexts to guarantee the lifeline of local insurgent support. This is not far from the pattern in Yemen, where al-Qaida in the Peninsula is trying to avoid the mistakes of Iraq and therefore attentive to the interests of influential tribal leaders as well as the Southern Movement.
The deaths of Sheikh Said, Abu Ayyub and Abu Umar are important development in the war against al-Qaida. But the key lifeline to al-Qaida in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen is its tribal and organizational alliances. Those alliances were undermined quite significantly in the Iraqi case, with the awakening councils, the inhospitable Arab-Sunni tribal areas, and the clashes with other armed groups most notably the Islamic Army of Iraq and the 1920 Revolution Brigades. Such developments have no parallels yet in Afghanistan and Yemen.
Decapitating the organizational leaders of al-Qaida, despite its significance, is not enough to end the lifeline for the rest of its transnational bodies. The other effect is that it may enhance the “demand side” to support or join al-Qaida. In his memoirs, Sayyid Qutb mentions that out of the 98 Muslim Brothers member imprisoned with him, 35 strongly supported his newly developed radical ideology, 23 strongly opposed, and 50 were hesitant. After his execution, the number of supporters and sympathizers was not only in the hundreds of thousands, but the commitments and the manifestations, took another level.
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In On Spies and Introductions I’ve already referred to the unfortunate Marwan Affair. I knew Ashraf Marwan, the son-in-law of Egypt’s former President Gamal Abdel Nasser, quite well. In Israel’s Wars I hinted that he was an Egyptian spy who misled the Israeli Mossad, and I went on… View the full article +
In On Spies and Introductions I’ve already referred to the unfortunate Marwan Affair.
I knew Ashraf Marwan, the son-in-law of Egypt’s former President Gamal Abdel Nasser, quite well. In Israel’s Wars I hinted that he was an Egyptian spy who misled the Israeli Mossad, and I went on to provide more details in A History of Israel.
However, my concealed references to him in these and other publications, led to a serious spat between us: Marwan responded with an outright denial in an Egyptian newspaper, dubbing my version of events a “silly detective story”, and I – then - unmasked him, challenging him to prove that he wasn't the agent in question. News of the spat was widely reported in the Middle Eastern press.
Then came the plot twist that even the most audacious writer of fiction might balk at: Marwan made contact with me and we met in person for the first time, on 23 October 2003, at the Intercontinental Hotel in Park Lane; we would keep in touch for five years. In our meeting I suggested to Marwan that I write a book about his life, but he had a better idea. He said, “I’ll write the book myself and you’ll be my consultant … I‘ll consult you from time to time”, which he did.
On 26 June 2007, we spoke on the phone – as we would often do - and agreed to meet the next day. Several times I popped up from my basement office at Strand Bridge House to get mobile reception to see if Marwan had called, but eventually I gave up and left. That day Marwan was found dead after falling from the balcony of his fourth-floor flat in central London.
The post-mortem determined that Marwan had died as a result of a rupture to the aorta, caused by the fall, but beyond that little is certain. The police investigation took three years to complete and last week a coroner in London held an inquest into Marwan’s death.I was invited to give evidence and was asked about our 26th June telephone conversation, the meeting that never happened, and about the manuscript of his book that has not been seen since his death; as far as the family is concerned, the missing book is one of the strongest indications that he was murdered.
After three days of deliberations the coroner, William Dolman, rejected suggestions of suicide or murder and he returned an open verdict on the death. He said, “there are many unanswered questions [that involve the] murky and secretive world of espionage. We simply don’t know the facts, despite careful investigation. Did he jump or did he fall? Here the evidence does not provide a clear answer”.
His wife Mona – the dignified daughter of Gamal Abdel Nasser – welcomed the verdict but she insists that, “he was murdered … I’m sure that there was somebody else involved”.
The family have vowed to continue their search for the truth, but for now it seems that Marwan's enigmatic life and death will continue to remain a mystery.
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It has become something of an article of faith to say that poverty and economic misfortune are not drivers of terrorism. This seems a sensible conclusion to reach when one considers the volume of poverty and misery in the world and the relatively small volume of terrorists that emerge from it. Were… View the full article +It has become something of an article of faith to say that poverty and economic misfortune are not drivers of terrorism. This seems a sensible conclusion to reach when one considers the volume of poverty and misery in the world and the relatively small volume of terrorists that emerge from it. Were poverty truly a determinant of a predilection for terrorist radicalization then theoretically speaking there would be far more terrorists in this world than there are.
But at the same time, it seems clear that there is some sort of correlation between social deprivation and radicalization – even if only from the perspective that it often appears as a constant in communities where radicalization seems able to take root (though of course this is not always the case). This is a difficult correlation to understand as it is not one that appears to exist on a steady or universal gradient, but it is clearly plays some sort of a role in the radicalization picture.
Understanding this question, however becomes increasingly salient as we enter ever tighter economic times, as theoretically speaking we are increasing one of the possible drivers. The core point is: are we are going to see an increase in radicalization amongst communities as they feel the economic squeeze?
One possible vision of the consequent trends can be seen in the recent annual Europol report on terrorism trends in the EU (which I wrote about for the Jamestown Foundation). Amongst other things, it highlighted a growing level of concern about left-wing and anarchist radicalization: “In 2009, the total number of left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks in the EU increased by 43% compared to 2008 and more than doubled since 2007.”
These trends are discernable at a wider level too: the emergence in the UK of far-right groups like the English Defence League appears to at least in part be the product of social disaffection stirred up by disenfranchisement. Rioting in Greece has taken an increasingly violent turn and there has also been a more general increase in anarchist violence and extremist activity. And German officials have expressed concern about the discovery of an 80-page pamphlet entitled “Prisma” which offers ideas for bomb-making, avoiding detection by police and other tips for urban guerrillas. They have also marked a 53% jump in left-wing attacks in 2009 which has included some large scale acts of vandalism and violence.
All of which would point to an increase in radicalization amongst communities that do not appear to be so directly influenced by the Al Qaeda narrative. So does this mean that the poor economic climate is directly contributing to radicalization in general: youths are becoming angry at the system and fighting against it, is the free time they are left with due to their economic disenfranchisement giving them the time to indulge in such activity? Well, possibly, but it seems as though it would be best not to leap to any conclusions about this quite yet or any draconian reactions. Anyway, what exactly would be the abrupt security reaction be: pour security funding into economic stimulus packages?
At the end of the day what we might assess as the underlying causes of some of the increase in right/left/anarchist violence may indeed be the economic crisis, but care must be paid to not exaggerate our response to this particular cause over others. As previous experience has shown, an exaggerated response leads to mistakes the impact of which is impossible to measure.
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H.E. Tzipi Livni brought the event to a close with an hour long speech entitled ‘Fighting Against Terror – Fighting for Peace’, in which she discussed a range of issues surrounding the Middle East peace process and Israel’s standing on the world stage. Below is a summary of… View the full article +
H.E. Tzipi Livni brought the event to a close with an hour long speech entitled ‘Fighting Against Terror – Fighting for Peace’, in which she discussed a range of issues surrounding the Middle East peace process and Israel’s standing on the world stage. Below is a summary of the speech, the full recording of which will be made available on this site shortly.
She began by explaining that the main threat to Israel emanates from extreme religious ideologies which reject the values of the free world. The extremists who imbibe these beliefs fight to take away the rights and freedoms that they so often claim to represent, and are a threat not only to Israel, but to all liberal democracies.
Livni argued that organisations like Hamas and Hezbollah are at odds with the beliefs of their host governments, the Palestinian Authority and Lebanese government respectively and should not be allowed to take part in the political process. Her study of many of the leading constitutions in the world showed that none allow the participation of a terrorist group, and partaking in democracy is not only about gaining votes and must include a commitment to the values that it represents. Hezbollah are an armed militia and terrorist group, yet they are political partners with the Lebanese government – making the war on terror impossible to win in her opinion.
The existence of the Salafi-jihadi ideology means that the Israeli Palestinian issue is not the primary cause of global terrorism – and solving this issue will not immediately and miraculously placate al-Qaeda. The peace process is therefore first and foremost an Israeli interest, and one which Livni believed that Israel is still committed to.
She was also concerned about about the deep misunderstandings of Israeli actions such as the blockade, as well as their military operations, all measures that are designed to stop Hamas terrorism. It is difficult for Israelis to accept some of the criticism that is leveled against them, although she made it clear that she did not want Israel to be exempt from any censure or for the international community to turn a blind eye to their mistakes.
Kadima’s commitment to peace is unwavering, and the very difficult but necessary decision to force settlers from their homes in Gaza in 2006 – a decision which she claimed that her party was willing to make again – was made in order to expedite this process. However, she was also clear that no agreement can ever be made with Hamas, recognising the Palestinian Authority, as well as politicians such as the Third Way’s Salam Fayad, as the only legitimate actors in the region. She reminded the audience that Hamas have repeatedly refused to meet the requirements of the Quartet, and this is the main reason for the current controversial blockade. Behind closed doors, she said that many Arab leaders agree that Hamas must be stopped, and she had no doubt that the Arab world has a crucial role to play in any successful solution.
She concluded by saying that both sides now owe it to future generations to put aside discussions about who has the right to an embarrassingly small piece of land, and they must now look forward and come to a viable agreement. This she firmly believed was still a strong possibility.
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‘How Terrorism Ends’ was the title of the final panel discussion of the conference, and despite a packed two day schedule, the speakers remained on top form. Moderated again by Dr. Peter Neumann, the panelists were: Professor Audrey Kurth Cronin, author of How Terrorism Ends;… View the full article +
‘How Terrorism Ends’ was the title of the final panel discussion of the conference, and despite a packed two day schedule, the speakers remained on top form. Moderated again by Dr. Peter Neumann, the panelists were: Professor Audrey Kurth Cronin, author of How Terrorism Ends; Shiraz Maher, Senior Research Fellow, ICSR and former seniot member of the British wing of Hizb ut-Tahrir; Hekmat Karzai, Director of the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies in Kabul; and Michael Semple, Fellow at Harvard’s Carr Centre.
Audrey Kurth Cronin kicked off the session by giving the audience a quick overview of the findings of her fine book, in which she identified the six main ways that terrorist groups come to an end:
1) A decapitation of the group in which the leader is killed or captured and the organisation dissolves;
2) Successful negotiations;
3) The group succeeds in achieving its aims;
4) The group fails, and loses popular support;
5) State repressed succeeds in crushing the group;
6) A re-orientation toward different behavior, whereby the group shifts its focus to criminal enterprise or insurgency.
Of these six, it was the fourth outcome that Kurth Cronin found to be the most common.
Shiraz Maher was then asked by Dr. Neumann what prompted him to leave the extremist organisation in which he was involved for a number of years after 9/11. As well as citing his move to a city where he was not surrounded by former members, Maher also very interestingly noted of Islamist dogmas that “once you pick at them, they can collapse very quickly.”
Dr. Neumann then asked Hekmat Karzai to share with the audience some of the findings of a recent study his organisation had undertaken on how and why young people were becoming suicide bombers or fighting for terrorist groups in Afghanistan. Karzai gave five main motivators:1) Financial: Many fighters join groups for the monetary benefits, and the families of suicide bombers are often very well taken care of;
2) Revenge: civilian casualties have sometimes “provided the oxygen” which fuels extremism;
3) Lack of governance;
4) Madrassas: many insurgents and terrorists are brainwashed in religious schools;
5) Ideology: a salafi-jihadist belief system which demanded confrontation with the West.
Addressing the same issue, Michael Semple said that his research also found that many terrorists in Afghanistan join insurgent groups so as to earn a livelihood and gain a status in society unattainable in most other circumstances. He also cited a desire to be part of a peer network.
Asked by the Chair to compare the conditions for Muslims in Afghanistan and Europe, Shiraz Maher said that although there was a crucial dynamic difference, there is also a global and unified “core ideology”, which is shared by all extremists. He also referred to a number of jihadist defectors in Britain – such as Noman Benotmen and Abdullah Anas – who were working towards dismantling and countering the ideological roots of jihadism. Maher also recommended that any strategy adopted by the United States to prevent violent extremism should not co-opt non-violent Islamists, but must instead adopt a “values-led approach” that seeks to groups and individuals who represent these values.
The final part of the discussion addressed a question from the audience about how the current conflict in Afghanistan will end. Although the majority of the panelists agreed that there will have to be some form of political solution, which included negotiations with the Taliban. Karzai was concerned that the current strategy in the country was contradictory to the achievement of a political solution and that the approach had to change. The only dissenting voice was that of Shiraz Maher, who was skeptical about the effectiveness of any negotiations with the Taliban. He pointed to the series of failed talks between the Pakistani Taliban and the Pakistani government over the past years, which often reached agreements only for the Taliban to renege on them soon after – using lulls in combat to consolidate and expand.
On this interesting, if pessimistic, note, the final panel discussion of the conference was concluded and the stage was set for the final keynote address delivered by H.E. Tsipi Livni, former Israeli Foreign Minister and no leader of the opposition Kadima Party.
Introduction
FREErad!cals is the ICSR blog. It's a forum for debate and fresh ideas on radicalisation and political violence. It features some of the most innovative, young thinkers, discussing radicals and radicalisation. They are looking at how the challenge has been understood, and how it should be addressed.
Contributors
Guest Contributors
Recommended Reading
-
General
- The Long War Journal
- Global Terrorism Analysis – Jamestown Foundation
- MICROCON: A Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict
- University of Maryland, START Center
- Terrorism and Homeland Security – RAND
- Terrorism Answers – Council on Foreign Relations
- Institute for War & Peace Reporting
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty
-
Blogs
- Jihadica
- The Cable
- Abu Muqawama
- Danger Room - What’s Next in International Security
- Jarret.Brachman.Phd
- Small Wars Journal Blog
- Kings of War
- Counterterrorism Blog
-
Regional
- Ghosts of Alexander
- Registan
- The Pakistan Policy Blog
-
Online Radicalisation
- Cyber Law Blog
- Ubiwar
- MetaSecurity Security of Virtual Worlds
- Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University
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Posted by Ahron Bregman on 02/09/10