

## 6 Explaining the causes of radical Islam in Europe

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Bernard Lewis has taught us about the civil war within Islam and the encounter of that civil war with the West.<sup>1</sup> The Muslim encounter with Western modernity and globalization has given rise to a nativist reaction. Nowhere is the encounter between Muslims and the West sharper than in Western Europe, which has experienced significant immigration of Muslims from the Middle East, South Asia, and elsewhere.

This chapter examines identity issues among Muslims in Europe and the new sense of global solidarity shared by European Muslims with other Muslims throughout the world. Two factors are radicalizing European Muslims today: identity issues, and a growing global Muslim connectedness and pride. Although the focus of this chapter is on the UK and France where most of my interviews took place, I address a phenomenon that is occurring broadly throughout Western Europe.

Muslims in European society struggle with dissatisfaction with traditional and modern forms of identity. The grandson of an Egyptian who is born in France feels neither Egyptian nor French. A new identity eludes him, and extremist imams, together with messages from internet websites and Arab satellite media, fill the identity vacuum and persuade him to believe in a radical view of Islam. His allegiance to the European country where he now lives, and to the culture of his immigrant parents and grandparents, has been weakened in favor of a new Muslim identity.

One consequence of the re-identification of the offspring of immigrants as “born-again” Muslims is their increasing separation from European cultural values rather than integration into their host countries in Europe. This chapter presents five important factors in the rise of radical Islam in Europe and then describes four inadequate government responses that are noticeably failing to stem Muslim radicalization.

### **Factors that radicalize the Muslim population in Europe**

#### *Decline in nationalism*

Europe is experiencing a decline in nationalism just as transnational Islam is rising. The twentieth century was tough on Europe: two world wars, a holocaust,

the abrupt end of colonialism, the loss of relative power status compared to America and Russia, and the attempt to create a new EU identity are some of the myriad factors that make nationalism passé.<sup>2</sup> Many native French have trouble embracing French patriotism, given the twentieth-century legacy of collaboration under the Vichy in World War II and colonial rule in North Africa.<sup>3</sup> The British elites are bending over backwards to provide cultural autonomy to their immigrant communities without quite spelling out what it means to be British (which is, itself, a mix of English and other national identities). Can the Polish worker who comes to Germany, let alone third-generation Turks living in Cologne, expect to become German? In Holland and Scandinavia, there does not seem to be a host national identity to offer.

The best defense against political Islam may be nationalism which, like religion, draws on primordial bonds dating back generations. If Kuwaitis think like Kuwaitis, not like Muslims, they can be weaned away from global extremist influences such as al Qaeda.<sup>4</sup> This strategy may work in America, where Jacksonian nationalism remains strong, but the erosion of nationalism in Europe makes it difficult to persuade French or Dutch Muslims to enthusiastically identify themselves as French or Dutch citizens. What may work in America, Russia or even in the Middle East, where relatively young states seek national legitimacy, may not work in today's Europe.

The European Muslim feels only a vague national identity with his host country. Given the confusion over the definition of a Frenchman or a European, what European values should Muslim immigrants absorb? The second and third generations of Muslims in Europe have largely rejected the traditional ethnic roots of their parents, but have failed to become wholly accepted by the majorities in European states despite their linguistic and cultural education in their host countries. Unmoored from the past and the present, they become easy prey to those who promise a future with power and respect derived from a politicized version of Muslim identity – hence, the allure of the born-again Muslim.<sup>5</sup>

### *Negative demographic trends*

Demographic trends reinforce the challenges of integrating Muslims into European society. A high Muslim birth rate in Europe and an alarmingly low birth rate among indigenous Europeans, combined with the tendency for Muslims to live in urban areas, suggest that many European cities will have Muslim majorities by 2020 or 2025, even with immigration restrictions on Muslims into Europe.

In many Western European cities, the Muslim population exceeds 10 percent. Such a high number complicates assimilation. In a few cities, the population of Muslims is approaching the 50 percent tipping point, or will do so in the coming decades given current demographic trends of a declining European native birth rate, a higher Muslim birth rate, and continuing immigration.

In Bradford, UK, one of the early destinations of Pakistani immigrants after the Second World War, the 1991 census recorded 64,000 Muslims representing

13 percent of the population. By 2001 there were 94,000 Muslims, a 50 percent increase from 1991. In 2001, Muslims represented 19 percent of the overall population but over 30 percent of students and 50 percent of toddlers. By 2011, Muslims will represent close to 30 percent of the population in Bradford and over 50 percent of its students.<sup>6</sup> The high growth rates and youth bubble create a burgeoning pool of young Muslim males, the key source of recruitment for Islamists.

By 2025 to 2030, there will be Muslim majorities in the under-twenties urban cohort throughout Europe. Even in the absence of the virulent Islamist ideologies swirling around Europe today, it is difficult to imagine the smooth assimilation of Muslim immigrants into European society, given their exuberant demography coupled with downward population trends among native Europeans. These demographic movements may be the gravest challenge to European stability and prosperity in the coming decades.

### ***Muslim “preceptorism”***

European-born children and grandchildren of immigrants of Muslim faith are increasingly being politicized as Muslims with separate identities from their host European societies by persuasive messages from both local and global “preceptors.” By preceptors, I mean a range of figures and phenomena including imams in London, Birmingham, and Lyon, local Muslim leaders and spokespersons, international Islamic icons like Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Hassan Nasrallah in Afghanistan, Iran, and Lebanon, *jihadi* internet websites and 24/7 Arab satellite media.

“Preceptorism” is a term coined by the Yale social scientist Charles E. Lindblom in the 1975 classic *Politics and Markets*, to describe intense ideological indoctrination using persuasive messages to mobilize cadres of true believers. Preceptors tend to be charismatic orators who rely on persuasion to gain the voluntary enthusiasm of their disciples rather than on fear and command used by the average dictator in the command system, or on appeals to individual self-interest based on material and economic incentives in the capitalist-oriented exchange system.<sup>7</sup> Preceptorial leaders are mobilizers of the street who prey on lost souls and transform them into true believers through indoctrination.<sup>8</sup>

More attention needs to be given to the role of persuasion from imams in mosques than to the narratives conveyed on the *jihadi* internet and in bookshops. Organized radical groups like Hizb-ut-Tahrir, based in the UK, are brainwashing new generations of British Muslims by indoctrinating them with homophobic, anti-Semitic, chauvinistic, anti-women rhetoric calling for the return of the Caliphate. Yet British Home Office authorities refuse to ban them because these groups have not broken the law.<sup>9</sup>

The techniques used by imams in their recruitment and mobilization of Muslims in Europe are similar to those used in Maoist China, where small groups would meet to engage in self-criticism and introspection to learn the

ideological elements of the Red Book. Omar Bakri Mohammed, a Syrian-born imam and founder of one UK group, Al-Muhajiroun, articulates the process of persuading a new recruit. Activist members:

are careful to let the individual come to his or her own conclusion about the issue through conversation and dialogue ... [L]et himself tell me the problem. You don't figure it out for him. You want him to figure out the problem [and take the decision to look deeper into Islam]. *Unless he himself determines the problem, he will never have conviction.* That is the fundamental condition of conviction – self-determination. [Emphasis added]<sup>10</sup>

Once the individual is in the fold, the successful imam no longer needs to give specific orders to his followers.

The final stage of indoctrination is the critical point on the conveyor belt to militancy where identity issues crystallize into an ideological dynamic. The convert is given a Muslim name, replacing his secular one, and becomes part of a much larger and more powerful group than his host country or his parents' country of origin. The imams nurture this feeling that they owe their primary loyalty not to their nation of residence or to their race or ethnicity but to Islam. The young Muslim male from Leeds now identifies with Muslim victims all over the world – from Chechnya, Bosnia, and the Palestinian territories to Iraq. He also has an explanation for his grievances against his host country: *Islamophobia*. He now thinks that they discriminate against him not, as in the case of other non-Muslim minorities, because of his dark skin color, but because he is Muslim.

Timothy Garton Ash links up the various psychological and social mechanisms discussed above in explaining the pathology of the offspring of immigrants, which he calls the "Inbetween People." Discussing the Dutch-Moroccan murderer of Theo Van Gogh in Holland, he writes:

Bouyeri's story has striking similarities with those of some of the London and Madrid bombers, and members of the Hamburg cell of al Qaeda who were central to the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York. There's the same initial embrace and then angry rejection of modern European secular culture, whether in its Dutch, German, Spanish, or British variant, with its common temptations of sexual license, drugs, drink, and racy entertainment; the pain of being torn between two home countries, neither of which is fully home; the influence of a radical imam, and of Islamist material from the Internet, audiotapes, or videocassettes and DVDs; a sense of global Muslim victimhood, exacerbated by horror stories from Bosnia, Chechnya, Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq; the groupthink of a small circle of friends, stiffening one's resolve; and the tranquil confidence with which many of these young men seem to have approached martyrdom. Such suicide killers are obviously not representative of the great majority of Muslims living peacefully in Europe; but they are, without question, extreme and excep-

tional symptoms of a much broader alienation of the children of Muslim immigrants to Europe. Their sickness of mind and heart reveals, in an extreme form, the pathology of the Inbetween People.<sup>11</sup>

### ***The impact of Arab satellite media exposure of Israeli-Palestinian and Iraqi violence***

One senior Foreign Office official told me that in focus groups among British Muslims during the height of the second Intifada in early 2003, the salience of Palestinian issues was higher than Kashmiri issues despite the fact that the vast majority of the interviewees were descended from Kashmir and other parts of South Asia.<sup>12</sup> This vicarious identification suggests the cumulative impact of Arab satellite media exposure of Israeli-Palestinian violence, and offers a partial explanation of the context in which two educated British Muslims of Pakistani descent went to Tel Aviv to blow themselves up at a popular bar filled with teenagers in the spring of 2003. The perceived denial of dignity and recognition on the part of the Palestinians is transmitted to the European Muslim with a desire to act and to “impose oneself on the West through an act of terror.”<sup>13</sup>

This *identity of vicarious grievances* that European Muslims feel for their brethren in Palestine, Iraq, Chechnya, and Kashmir arises out of the focused persuasive messages from Islamist imams and leaders, internet sites and media outlets.<sup>14</sup> Alienated from the country in which they reside, European Muslims have developed an empathy with Muslim victims throughout the world, and convince themselves that their own exclusion and the persecution of their brothers have the same roots: rejection of Islam by the West.<sup>15</sup> The result of this saturation of preceptoral messages and vicarious identity is the development of a renewed global Islamic solidarity. It is interesting that the Ottoman Empire and its German advisers in the First World War tried and failed to use an appeal to Islamic solidarity to mobilize Muslims from British and Russian-controlled parts of the Middle East and South Asia to revolt against their non-Muslim overlords. The *jihad* of the twenty-first century is much more ideologically based, media-oriented, “virtual,” and effective than the German-concocted Ottoman *jihad* a century ago.

The Muslim world’s reaction to the Danish cartoon drawings of the Prophet Mohammed and to Pope Benedict’s speech in 2006 citing a medieval Byzantine ruler’s unflattering comments about Islam are examples of a renewed global Islamic solidarity that results from preceptoral messages emanating from Islamist imams, leaders, internet and Arab satellite media. The collective Muslim “we” was offended and signaled in its strong response to the Danish magazine’s cartoons and the Pope’s speech in Regensburg, Germany, that “when you say something or do something you are not just talking to the Egyptians or to the Syrians or to the Saudis, but you are talking to the entire Muslim world.”<sup>16</sup>

The cartoon controversy silenced most European moderate Muslims who were privately aghast at the demonstrations, embassy burnings, and killing of

hundreds of people over the publication of cartoons. So strong is the collective Muslim identity that the individual finds himself unable to speak out. The ambivalent moderate Muslim cannot bring himself to support the infidel against a violent or extremist fellow Muslim.<sup>17</sup> Identifying moderates and preventing them from being pilloried as traitors within their own community are two important challenges.

### *The role of Muslim leadership*

One would have thought that following the 7/7 London bombing, the Muslim community and national leaders would have addressed the serious *reputation* damage wreaked by terrorists on the Muslim community by confronting radical and separatist trends. Instead, they too often promoted the grievance politics of Islamophobia and mobilized otherwise apolitical Muslims to blame government policies on the Middle East.

The British Muslim leaders request that the government moderate its policies in Iraq and Israel-Palestine in order to prevent their constituencies in Leicester from radicalizing. To illustrate this point, the Muslim Council of Britain, the country's leading Muslim organization, issued a press release in response to the Home Secretary's call for British Muslim parents to be vigilant of their children's slide towards extremism.

#### **Press Release**

#### **Government Has a Duty Also to Help Prevent Spread of Extremist Ideas**

In response to the speech earlier today from the Home Secretary, John Reid, the Muslim Council of Britain firmly believes that all parents, both Muslims and non-Muslims, have an important responsibility in being vigilant and ensuring that their children are not misled by criminal and extremist elements in society. However, the MCB notes that the government needs to also recognize the impact of some of its own policies, domestic and foreign, in contributing to the spread of extremist-ideas.

"It is as though in response to the threat of Global Warming and the threat of rising water levels, the government were to ask all of us merely to place sandbags outside our homes to prevent flooding. Surely, the more sensible way forward would be to tackle the causes of Global Warming. Similarly, in continuing to ignore the damage that some of our foreign policies, particularly in the Middle East, have done to our national security, the government is not facing up to a major contributory factor behind the rise of extremism," said Dr Muhammad Abdul Bari, Secretary-General of the Muslim Council of Britain.<sup>18</sup>

Rather than focus attention on the "bad apples" that are sullyng the UK Muslim community's reputation, the British Muslim leadership tends to divert attention to unpopular foreign policies. This amounts to political blackmail. British policy

towards Iraq and Israel-Palestine should be governed by the local adversaries' actions (i.e., whether or not terrorists are launching suicide bombings or rocket attacks), rather than the vicarious echo effect transmitted by Arab satellite media on the Muslim community living in Bradford, UK.

Some might argue that one solution is to change Western foreign policy: asking for even-handedness on Israel-Palestine and withdrawal from Iraq. However, the problem is that Islamist-inspired terrorism occurs also in places with persistent anti-American and anti-Israeli policies like France and Belgium.

When President Jacques Chirac voiced opposition to the Iraq war in 2003, Muslim taxi drivers in Paris called him Muhammad Chirac.<sup>19</sup> Yet the Islamists target European countries that oppose the war as much as those that support the war. The ire of the Islamists appears to be Western democratic values, not the politics or foreign policy of individual countries. The Islamist political agenda is to contest Western humanist values: sexual equality and freedom of religion and speech. They want religious-based political parties and the creation of Shari'a tribunals for civil and domestic matters. Even if they cannot achieve these precise goals, they hope to deepen the divide between Muslims and non-Muslims and thereby radicalize Muslim communities.<sup>20</sup>

## **Inadequate government responses**

### ***Government disregard of fence-sitters***

A major factor that handicaps efforts to stem radicalization of European Muslims is the tendency of governments to ignore "fence-sitters," the large group of ambivalent Muslims who prefer the benefits of modern European life and economic opportunity but also sympathize with the political aims of terrorists such as the 7/7 London bombers. They are called fence-sitters because they sit on the border of radicalization. They could go either way.

To demonstrate just how important fence-sitters are to fighting domestic terrorism, European governments do not have the resources to monitor effectively the 1 percent hardcore Islamists in their countries when another 10 percent of the Muslim populations are providing tacit support to the hardcore. In Ireland, the IRA was not defeated until the fence-sitters ceased to provide tacit support to IRA activists.<sup>21</sup>

British authorities cannot easily root out home-grown Islamic terrorists as long as large numbers of British Muslims look the other way. According to a poll commissioned for a British television program aired in August 2006, 23 percent of British Muslims felt the 7/7 London bombers were justified due to British support for the US War on Terror. Elements within the larger Muslim community sometimes shield local *jihadis* from authorities as they conspire to make future attacks or link up with other *jihadis* in Iraq and elsewhere. British authorities must convince fence-sitters that their tacit support of terror activities damages the reputation of the Muslim community. These fence-sitters must be

shown the benefits of their cooperation in informing authorities of extremist activities.

The importance of fence-sitters to law enforcement officials is reinforced by the increasing indigenization of radicals. Until the Bouyeri assassination of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, the Dutch government emulated other European countries' counter-terrorism practices by monitoring foreigners, such as veteran Afghan and Bosnian *salafi-jihadis*, whose distinctive dress made them easy to spot. The foreign *jihadis* do not pose the same security challenge for authorities as does the monitoring of the "New *Jihadis*," home-grown, third-generation Moroccan Dutch radicals, often teenagers, who are incubating in their local Moroccan communities in The Netherlands and elsewhere.<sup>22</sup> It will be difficult for authorities to persuade the fence-sitters in these communities to turn in their neighbors and kinsmen.

A broader political problem faced by the West is that many fence-sitters among the silent majority of Muslims who live peacefully in Europe will join the extremists if they perceive that Muslims have prospects of achieving "victory" in Europe.<sup>23</sup> Fence-sitters tend to go with the winning side. Both European governments and Muslim leaders need to persuade the broader Muslim community that siding with radical Islam is a lost cause.

### ***European governments' disproportionate emphasis on criminalizing terrorism***

Some European government responses are so inadequate that they represent additional causes of radicalization. The defect in British and other European government approaches to the radicalization of Islam is their refusal to grapple with the ideology of Islamist movements, the mobilizing factor of young Muslims in Europe. One side is fighting a war under the banner of Islam, while the other side, comprising European states and society, is treating the war as a social or criminal problem to be rectified through improved social engineering and court hearings.

The problem with the European approach is that criminalizing terrorism ignores the radicalizing effect of the imam-preceptors, who do not actually commit a criminal act. If persuasion is the critical enabler of radicalization, then criminal law-enforcement approaches to the War on Terror that focus on the operational but not on the motivational side may not be sufficient to deal with the terrorist threat. Emphasis must be placed on influential figures such as Abu Hamza al Masri, the imam who preached to such congregants as Richard Reid, the Shoe Bomber, and Zacarias Moussaoui, the twentieth 9/11 hijacker. By understanding and responding to imams like Abu Hamza, who make deep impressions on their followers, such as Muslim Brotherhood leader Yusuf Qaradawi, whose internet-issued *fatwas* justify suicide bombings in Iraq and Israel, governments can begin to mitigate the threat of terror in Europe. For every charismatic imam, there are possibly 20 more young men converted to the cause of killing themselves in carrying out missions against non-believers in the name of Islam.

### ***Inadequate military response***

By the same logic, the US tendency to emphasize military solutions to this ideological war is similarly flawed. Military attacks, like court proceedings, tend to target the end-user, the terrorist, rather than those who inspire the attacks. The hypothetical aforementioned 1:20 ratio of imam to operatives provides a context for understanding former US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's memorable 16 October 2003 query: "Is our current situation such that 'the harder we work, the behinder we get?'" In other words, is the pool of extremists from whom terrorists are drawn growing faster than known terrorists can be captured or killed? From mosques and schools to one-on-one mentoring to "virtual *jihad*" over the internet, the multiplier effect of recruitment by radical preceptors becomes apparent.

### ***Misguided policy focus***

Government attempts to co-opt political Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood and elsewhere in order to isolate radicals are misguided. Many Muslim leaders in Europe present themselves to governments as moderates who can rein in extremists. The agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, is not a violent one, but a political one: to politicize the Muslims in Europe into voting blocs that advocate Muslim agendas on domestic issues such as the role of Shari'a law, and on international issues such as the illegitimacy of the State of Israel. This strategy takes advantage of the desperation of government elites and their unwillingness to confront political Islam, despite the undermining effect of political Islamists on European values such as free speech and gender equality. The longer term problem is not *jihadis* but the non-violent political Islamists who are mobilizing the heretofore politically apathetic majority of European Muslims into an advocacy group on foreign policy and veiling. The enfranchisement of young Muslims may allow political Islamists to take advantage of their exuberant demography to affect European policies in profound ways, posing a long-term danger.

France, in particular, is at a critical moment with respect to the teeming underclass living in social ghettos outside its main cities, especially Paris. If the harsh tactics of the police that in part provoked the autumn 2005 riots are replaced by engagement and dialogue between the preponderantly Muslim teenagers and young men and the community outreach groups, then the Islamists may be unable to prevail. Absent the ability of the post-Chirac leadership to generate reform and jobs in the *banlieues*, however, the Islamists will provide an alternative for those unemployed lost souls who now either join a nihilistic gang or try to assimilate and suffer the associated social stigma of going straight from their cohorts in the ghettos. Political Islam will always offer empowerment in the face of social rejection by French society.

A crucial question is: What happens if those rioters in the *banlieues* start voting? Enfranchisement is a good thing.<sup>24</sup> However, some officials in the

French Interior Ministry worry privately that enfranchising angry young males may not reduce radicalism. While French Muslims have hitherto not voted as a bloc,<sup>25</sup> this may be attributable to the low voting rate among young Muslim males. Not unlike the Hamas surge in the January 2006 elections, future French elections could see angry Muslim males mobilizing behind populist politicians either from the Islamist camp or their leftist allies in the anti-American and anti-globalist camp. If Muslim political activists are able to forge a coalition of Muslim identity voters and non-Muslim leftists, anti-globalists, and anti-American voters, they could exert a preponderant influence on the domestic and foreign policies of their governments. It is hard to imagine how contrary voices calling for closer European-American collaboration will prevail in the face of the growing empowerment of political Muslims in Europe.

### Conclusion

It is difficult to pinpoint the myriad factors that give rise to Muslim identity issues. Important background issues include unemployment, social exclusion, disappointment in expectations relative to their parents' generation and their non-Muslim peers, erosion of traditional authority, erosion of national identity and decline in support for European liberal democratic values, and the failure of a pan-European identity to replace eroding national identities. Add to this mix European hyper-secularism and hostility to faith, and one finds fertile grounds for radicalization.

The decline of ethnic attachment, cultural mores, parental authority, and traditional family values combined with identity shopping of many young Europeans in a region with amorphous identities leaves a vacuum for Islamist imams to sell a Muslim identity that is attractive to many young European Muslims. Islamism offers an elixir of power to compensate for feeling powerless in the face of Western and especially American power. On a more local level, one French writer describes the difficulty for the young French Muslim male, who despairs of ever leaving his ghetto and becoming part of French society, to resist the attraction of power offered by Islamists. By choosing the Islamist route, he avoids both the stigma of being labeled a delinquent gang-member in the *banlieue*, and the "Uncle Tom" label from his peers as a traitor who attempts to embrace French norms. The best way to overcome his feeling of powerlessness is to become a born-again Muslim.<sup>26</sup>

Discrimination and socio-economic deprivation alone do not account for radicalization. The fallacy of highlighting socio-economic deprivation as the root cause of radicalism is demonstrated by the fact that poverty, exclusion, and racism experienced by European Muslims are also experienced by other groups *that are not Muslim* in Europe, including sub-Saharan African and Caribbean immigrants and their offspring. These groups have not become radicalized.<sup>27</sup> The catalyst for the radicalization of European Muslims that is absent among their non-Muslim cohorts is *the pull of Muslim solidarity*. European Muslims are part of a gigantic wave of Islamism sweeping the globe post-9/11.

By understanding the indoctrination of European Muslims as the source of radicalization and separation from mainstream European values, governments can begin to craft appropriate policies to counter radicalization. The essential point is to counter the political agendas of Islamists. The radicalization of European Muslims is not just a terrorist problem, or primarily a terrorist problem. It is a political problem in that the mobilizing of European Muslims to advocate political goals such as the imposition of Shari'a law, the banning of homosexuality, a differentiation of rights between genders, the delegitimization of Israel, the pursuit of anti-American policies, and the support of radical *jihadis* and Islamists abroad are as much the goals of non-violent political Islamists as they are of radical Islamists.

An artificial dichotomy between radical and political Islamists leads European governments to mistakenly empower political Islamists as “moderates” in order to isolate radical *salafi* Islamists under the theory that the main imperative is to prevent alienated Muslims from launching another London or Madrid bombing. Both types of Islamists advocate an intolerant, separationist value system antithetical to the Western value system that undergirds European democracies. The real split is between secular Muslims who want to climb the economic ladder and who identify themselves primarily as doctors, teachers, engineers or students, and only as Muslims in terms of their faith; and Islamists (both political and radical) who assert a world view based not on religious piety but on a global political movement.

The growth of Muslim true believers in Europe is a cause for great concern to European society and governments. Countering increasing radicalization is not an easy task.<sup>28</sup> It may require a forthright assertion of European values, and a recalibration of European laws in order to isolate the imam preceptors and prevent them from spewing their hatred in a way that attracts young Muslim followers.

## Notes

- 1 See B. Lewis, *Islam and the West*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, and, more recently, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*, New York: Random House Trade Publishers, 2004.
- 2 See also T. Judt, *Post-war; A History of Europe since 1945*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2006.
- 3 Conversation with the French philosopher, Alain Finkelkraut, in Paris, 3 November 2005.
- 4 O. Bakri Mohammed, head of Al-Muhajiroun and the imam-preceptor-mentor of the Mike's Place bombers in Tel Aviv, 2003, said after the Tel Aviv attack that “he was very proud of the fact that the Muslims grow closer every day, that the Muslim land is one land and *there is no more nationalism or Arabism*” (emphasis added). See Q. Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield 2005, pp. 6–7. I develop this theme more fully in my article, “When to Worry in the Middle East,” *Orbis*, fall 1993.
- 5 The attraction of the contemporary “virtual *umma*” is a core theme of Olivier Roy in *Globalized Islam*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.
- 6 A. R. Alexiev, presenter at Conference, “Les Démocraties face au défi Islamiste,”

- Institut pour la Defense de la Democratie and Center for Security Policy, Paris, 13 March 2006.
- 7 See C. E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets*, New York: Basic Books, 1975, ch. 4.
  - 8 Shmuel Bar, an Israeli expert on Islamist ideologies, used the term “lost souls” in an interview on 25 January 2006. See also Eric Hoffer’s classic book on mass movements, *The True Believer*, New York: Harper & Row, 1951.
  - 9 Conversation with Home Office official at a RUSI conference in London, autumn 2006. His argument was that banning HT would force them underground and make them more difficult to monitor. William Sieghart, Chairman of Forward Thinking, a UK NGO, made the same point to me following his dialogue with HT representatives (conversation in Berlin, 11 March 2007).
  - 10 Q. Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005, p. 97.
  - 11 T. Garton Ash, “Islam in Europe,” *New York Review of Books*, 5 October 2006, vol. 53, no. 15.
  - 12 Conversation with Mr. Fox, FCO Near East, 7 May 2003, Sussex, UK.
  - 13 Farhad Khoshrovar, in “Currents and Crosscurrents of Radical Islamism,” CSIS Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism Report, April 2006, p. 12.
  - 14 This term was coined by the French-Iranian sociologist, Farhad Khoshrovar. Conversation with Khoshrovar in Paris, 16 February 2006.
  - 15 Claude Moniquet testimony at house committee, April 2005. Available online at [www.esisc.org](http://www.esisc.org).
  - 16 *International Herald Tribune*, 8 February 2006, p. 8, col. 5. The collective identity pre-dates 2006. One young Moroccan-Dutch woman said that before the 9/11 attacks on New York, “I was just Nora. Then, all of a sudden, I was a Muslim.” Ash, *op. cit.*
  - 17 B. Bawer, *While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying Europe from Within*, New York: Doubleday, 2006, p. 229. There are exceptions, such as the two courageous North American Muslim women, Irshad Manji from Toronto and the Syrian-born Californian, Wafa Sultan.
  - 18 MCB Press Release, 20 September 2006. Abdel Bari was also quoted as saying that the British government should not be surprised if it finds itself deluged by two million terrorists, over 700,000 in London alone (two million happens to be the approximate Muslim population of the UK) if the government does not change its Islamophobic ways. *Daily Telegraph*, 10 September 2006, p. 1.
  - 19 Interview with Hervé de Carmoy, Paris, 16 February 2006.
  - 20 Claude Moniquet, House testimony, *infra*. Available online. at [www.esisc.org](http://www.esisc.org), p. 4.
  - 21 Shamit Saggat, University of Sussex lecture, 16 March 2006. Professor of Political Science at the University of Sussex and former adviser on minority affairs to the British Prime Minister’s Office, Saggat is an example of the hugely successful integration of Indian Ismaili immigrants expelled suddenly from Idi Amin’s Uganda in 1972. In addition to his focus on fence-sitters as the key to prevailing over radical elements in the British Muslim community, Saggat also propounds an integration formula based on bonding and bridging. There is nothing wrong with bonding elements in a minority community (for example, Orthodox Jewish schools) provided that there is also a tendency within the minority community to bridge into the larger society, such as in the case of the Eastern European Jewish immigrants in the first half of the twentieth century and the Indian immigrants from East Africa in the 1970s. Pietism among the Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim communities is a form of bonding that poses few problems in itself. The problem is the lack of bridging into the majority community, the absence of contact between the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities, and the growing politicization of youth in these communities.
  - 22 Moniquet, *op. cit.*
  - 23 This has implications for US policy towards Iran. If President Ahmadinejad appears to win the showdown with the West over the nuclear issue, many fence-sitters in

- Europe and around the world will conclude that radical Islam led by people like Ahmadinejad is winning, that Allah is winning and the West is in retreat. If such a perception takes hold among Muslim populations, pro-American moderate regimes in the region, along with more tolerant Muslim figures in Europe, will lose ground.
- 24 See the International Crisis Group report issued following the riots in early 2006, which calls for enfranchisement of underprivileged young French adults in these ghettos as an important step forward. See also Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse, *Integrating Islam, Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France*, New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2006.
- 25 See S. Giry, "France and Its Muslims," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2006, vol. 85, no. 5, pp. 87–104.
- 26 C. Beyler, "The Jihadist Threat in France," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, Hudson Institute, vol. 3, p. 92.
- 27 British and French Muslim immigration to Europe is relatively recent, dating from the late 1940s in the UK and the 1960s and 1970s in France. In order to fill acute labor needs, temporary workers were brought over – sometimes the males of entire villages in Pakistan to the UK and in Algeria to France – with the idea that they would return. Instead, they stayed and their families joined them. While *bonding* within these first-time immigrant communities remained strong, evidenced by the retention of strong ethnic ties to their countries of origin, *bridging* into the wider society was weak. They have lagged behind socio-economically. Some of the reasons why bridging is stronger among American Muslims is that they are far fewer in number than in Europe, they are more educated as they come from more advantaged communities in the Middle East and South Asia, and, finally, Muslim Americans are just another hyphenated American group more easily integrated into a society of immigrants. See "Currents and Crosscurrents of Radical Islamism," CSIS Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism Report, April 2006, p. 7. The unskilled working-class origins of European Muslim immigrants, as compared to the more highly educated, often professional background of American Muslim immigrants, explain some, but not all, of the socio-economic lag of the former. The Indian community emigrated *en masse* from Uganda to the UK in the 1960s with little economic wherewithal, and were expected to encounter similar difficulties in integrating. Yet, within a generation, many offspring of Ugandan Asians are successful professionals, engineers and so on.
- 28 The arrest of two dozen people in London and other British cities in August 2006 for plotting to blow up planes *en route* from London to the United States is a chilling reminder of how deep the problem of radical Islam in the United Kingdom has become. Nearly all the suspects are British-born Muslims of Pakistani descent. While there appear to be connections with Pakistani extremist groups, possibly even al Qaeda, the inescapable conclusion of this plot is that many British-born Muslims hate their country and America enough to blow themselves up in airplanes carrying innocent passengers. See J. S. Paris, "Radical Islam a Worrisome, Deep Problem in Britain," *Baltimore Sun*, 13 August 2006.